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FOREWORD
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is moving
forward with a broad set of innovation initiatives
designed to effectively posture the U.S. military for the
coming decades. One sub-set of initiatives, the Third
Offset, is focused on leap-ahead technologies and
capabilities that may offset competitor parity in critical
domains.
In support of the Army’s examination of the Third
Offset, the U.S. Army War College conducted a 6-month
project employing faculty and student researchers to
study the potential impact of the DoD’s Third Offset
Strategy on the Army. The study team examined the
Third Offset Strategy from a strategic perspective. Ultimately, the study is designed to help the Army understand the influence of the Third Offset capabilities on
the character of warfare and the implications of these
capabilities for the Army and Landpower. This understanding may then help inform decisions in research
and development, as well as leader development,
training, and organizations.
According to the study team, the development of
hyper-advanced capabilities and technologies will
have implications for the Army in the institutional,
leader development, and moral or ethical spaces, and
the study team urges the Army to begin preparing
now to meet the challenges. The study team’s consistent finding throughout their work is the inevitability
of advanced Third Offset capabilities, particularly in
the areas of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous
systems. The team contends that the potential for enormous profits will drive industry to push the envelope
in these areas. Eventually, these advanced (civilian)
technologies will find their way into the military
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space as game-changing systems. The team warns that
adversaries are less constrained than the United States
is in the militarization of AI and autonomous systems
and are aggressively pursuing these capabilities. They
predict that the advantage of being first is significant
and potentially disruptive.
This study will prove useful in helping the Army
identify and understand the implications of breakthrough innovations in future military operations.
It provides insights and recommendations that go
beyond the technology and capture the second and
third order effects on many Army systems. The
researchers’ assertion that a change in the fundamental
character of warfare could be an outcome only
adds urgency to the importance of this work.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press

x

SUMMARY
Samuel R. White, Jr.
Editor
“I believe we are on the cusp of a fundamental change
in the character of war.”
—General Mark Milley,
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, October 1, 2016.

The Defense Innovation Initiative (DII), begun in
November 2014 by former Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel, is intended to ensure U.S. military superiority
throughout the 21st century. The DII seeks broad-based
innovation across the spectrum of concepts, research
and development, capabilities, leader development,
wargaming, and business practices. An essential component of the DII is the Third Offset Strategy—a plan
for overcoming (offsetting) adversary parity or advantage, reduced military force structure, and declining
technological superiority in an era of great power
competition.
The Third Offset Strategy is in the beginning phases
of development. The Department of Defense (DoD) will
embark on a multi-year effort to assess the technologies
and systems that should undergo research and development. To date, investment has been modest, but will
likely increase over the next 4 years. The majority of
effort will be grouped into six broad portfolios:
1. Anti-access and area denial;
2. Guided munitions;
3. Undersea warfare;
4. Cyber and electronic warfare;
5. Human-machine teaming; and,
6. Wargaming and concepts development.
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The Third Offset Strategy is still being formed—at
this point, it is more concept than strategy—but the
ends, ways, and means will soon begin to crystalize.
It is important for the Army to study what the
Third Offset Strategy means for Landpower and the
land domain. Ground warfare has unique operating
conditions; the breakthrough capabilities needed for
the Army may likely
The Research Team
differ
from
those
This
study was prepared by sturequired by the Navy
dents and faculty from the U.S.
or Air Force. The Army, Army War College’s (USAWC)
therefore, should help Future Seminar—a program looseshape the Third Offset ly based on the Army After Next
Strategy to ensure it study project of the 1990s. Since
accommodates the needs 2014, Future Seminar students and
faculty have collaborated to explore
of land forces. In partic- the Army of the Future. As with
ular, it must identify previous years, the seminar focused
the implications of the on the requirements for an Army of
breakthrough capabili- the future. They studied, debated,
researched, and wrote.
ties on Landpower.
This study explored In addition to this report on the
the
implications
of Third Offset, a compendium of
innovations and break- their other papers will be published
through capabilities for to add to the discussion on the questhe operating environ- tion, “What kind of Army does the
nation need in 2035 and beyond?”
ment of 2035-2050. It
focused less on debating the merits or feasibility of individual technologies
and more on understanding the implications—the
second and third order effects on the Army that must
be anticipated ahead of the breakthrough. Four broad
implication areas were chosen for study, not because
they were exclusive to the Third Offset, but because
accounting for them requires a long-term enterprise
effort. The four areas are:
1. Implications for Army and Joint Capabilities;
xii

2. Implications for Army Institutions;
3. Implications for Army Leader Development;
and,
4. Implications for Moral and Ethical
Decision-Making.
A SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH
OBSERVATIONS
The Military Exploitation of Artificial Intelligence
(AI) and Autonomous Systems Is Inevitable
Commercial development of highly advanced
technologies is already well underway. IBM’s Watson,
Google’s Deepmind and Google Brain, and the Facebook AI Research Project are a few of the leaders in the
intensely competitive space of machine or deep learning. Even the Commonwealth of Virginia has established an Autonomous Systems Center of Excellence
(CoE) in Herndon.
As with past seismic shifts in the commercial space
(e.g., industrialization, motorization, the information
age) the competition is so severe because these are
likely to be what Clayton Christensen terms disruptive innovations—ideas and technologies that disrupt
current markets and displace current market leaders.
The potential rewards are staggering and billions (trillions?) are at stake.
These new technologies will follow a logical progression to military applications. There is a natural
symbiosis between military and civilian innovation
that, in the end, is driven by a need to solve problems
and gain advantage. The challenges and realities of big
data, complex networks and systems, uncertain environments, ubiquitous technology, and intense peer
xiii

competition are drivers in both the commercial and
military spaces and steer each toward a common set of
solutions. The separation between self-driving automobiles and autonomous military air and ground systems
is thin—and will grow thinner as deep and machine
learning increasingly blur the separation between
civilian or military applications. Once advanced AI is
achieved, it will quickly spiral into almost every area of
the commercial, governmental, and military domains.
Early Adoption of Third Offset Capabilities Is Critical Because Potential Adversaries Will Develop and
Field Capabilities without Constraint
The allure of science fiction-like capabilities will be
a strong incentive for states and nonstates to pursue
Third Offset technologies. These leap-ahead capabilities could be so game changing that the difference
between finishing first and finishing next could mean
years of decisive advantage in every meaningful area
of warfare.
The United States is rightfully concerned about the
implications of many of the Third Offset technologies—
but current policies and priorities are not reflective of
the rapidly evolving technologies or the operational
environment. As a result, the United States risks falling dangerously behind potential adversaries who are
investing heavily in advanced technologies—and are
doing so without self-imposed constraints which limit
capabilities and fail to allow full exploitation of these
technologies.
The DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapons
Systems, establishes requirements and parameters for
development and use of autonomous weapons systems
(AWS). In short, Directive 3000.09 seeks to minimize
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the risk of unintended lethal engagements by requiring
positive human interface for all semi-autonomous and
AWS, and prohibiting autonomous lethal force against
human targets. While this caution is understandable,
the policy is out of step with the evolving battlefield.
Placing a “human in the loop” requirement on
the development and employment of future weapons
systems may inadvertently induce vulnerability into
the system. Swarm technology has already exceeded
the capability for any meaningful human control of
individual agents and, as the technologies advance,
swarms of tens or hundreds of thousands of individual agents will make human control—or even human
understanding—of the actions and behaviors of the
swarms impossible. In the future vague and uncertain
environment, the decision to engage or not engage—to
kill or not kill—may not be best made by a human.
It is important that the U.S. Army deliberately
develop and embark on a campaign to develop and
exploit Third Offset capabilities. The battlefield of
the next 30 years will likely evolve far differently
(and much faster) than over the past 30 years. The
legacy “big five” combat systems, even with version
improvements and upgrades, may well be rendered
outmatched and ineffective by AI-enabled unmanned
autonomous systems, cyber dominance, and swarms.
Continued incremental upgrades to current systems
may address current readiness challenges, but could
leave the Army ill-prepared to contend on a far different battlefield in the future.
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Significant Acquisition, Budget, and Cultural Inertia
Exists Which Could Impact the Army’s Ability to
Gain Advantages with Third Offset Technologies
Erosion of U.S. military superiority will continue if
the DoD does not think critically and creatively about
the modernization challenges faced today and the
operational challenges to be confronted in the future.
This requires leaders to focus on limiting constraints to
innovation and providing a vision of the future force
and a path for developing the optimal future force.
The Army operating concepts of 2035-2050 must be
informed by Third Offset capabilities and not tied to
current organizations, doctrine, or weapons systems.
Facing tomorrow’s threats with today’s thinking and
systems will not be successful.
The Army (and the DoD) currently takes a risk
adverse approach to acquisition and requirements—
waiting for technologies to mature before prototyping
and experimentation. In order for the U.S. Army to
become an innovative organization, it must promote
an innovative culture, accept risk, and leverage new
ideas, while collaborating and partnering on experiments to enhance creativity. The Army must be an
early adopter of potentially disruptive technologies
and embrace incremental integration of technologies
as they mature.
The Army should exercise honest intellectual rigor
in envisioning and developing the future force. The
Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Force
2025 and Beyond maneuvers are a sound roadmap and
process, but caution must be given to avoid describing the future force by solving today’s problems with
today’s forces—equipped with tomorrow’s technology. This thinking will lead us to search for a better
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howitzer or tank, rather than ask the questions, “What
is better than a howitzer?” or “Do we still need tanks?”
Leader Development for a Third Offset Environment Must Begin Now
The current Army Leadership Requirements Model
addresses leader development focused on human-human relationships, but the future will challenge leaders
with more human-machine relationships. The Army
should adapt leader and team development strategies, underpinned by mission command philosophy
(centered on trust), leadership attributes (character,
presence, intellect), and core leadership competencies
(leads, develops, achieves), to enable our leaders to
aptly trust and lead organizations increasingly comprised of human and AI.
Highlighting agile and adaptive leaders and
mission command philosophy only superficially
addresses the emerging leadership skills required to
lead human-machine collaboration. Deeply embedded attributes need a distinct, deliberate approach
beginning with developing a leader’s propensity to
trust and methods to influence and train autonomous
systems. The Army has an opportunity to increase its
competitive advantage over adversaries by acting now
to develop leaders who are skilled at maximizing the
best of humans and machines.
The Moral Considerations of Third Offset
Capabilities Should be Addressed Before the
Technology Matures
Moral conflict will always be a part of war because
acceptable conduct in war will always conflict with
norms accepted in civilian life. This conflict creates a
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moral dissonance that can overwhelm a soldier’s sense
of right and wrong, good and bad, and can cause moral
and psychological injury.
Third Offset capabilities increasingly remove the
soldier from the conflict—introducing a video gamelike effect into ethical decision-making that often leads
to moral disengagement. These game ethics override
personal or organizational ethics because the technology removes the human-to-human contact necessary
to form a proper moral framework. Conflict and the
use of force (killing) become dehumanized and, once
the soldier has the opportunity for moral reflection, the
potential for moral injury is significant.
Widespread military use of AI-enabled decision
support and weapons systems is inevitable. The Army
must begin to mitigate the potential harmful impacts
of these technologies now. The Army should provide
training at all levels that reinforces ethical standards in
light of an increasingly virtualized battlefield. Operators of unmanned and semi-autonomous systems must
understand how the AI processes moral dilemmas, the
potential ethical shortcomings of these decisions, and
how to ensure ethical decisions are made. The Army
should educate leaders in the responsible employment of unmanned and AI systems, particularly in the
method the systems use to integrate ethical principles
into the decision-making process.
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The Third Offset May Create Unintended Risks by
Lowering Risk Thresholds, Subsidizing Foreign
Modernization Efforts, and Increasing the Risk of
Nuclear War
The Third Offset technologies increase the effectiveness of weapons and, as a byproduct, remove the
human warfighters from the battlefield, or limit their
exposure to direct action. By distancing the human
from conflict, the technology lowers not only the costs
and risks associated with war, but the political bar
to initiating hostilities as well. As a result, the deterrent quality desired in the Third Offset could actually
increase the likelihood that the United States would
use force and ultimately decrease global stability.
The DoD is openly soliciting and urging commercial entities to work on technologies that will be used
to offset the capabilities of U.S. military competitors.
This unconcealed approach, which is markedly different from previous offsets, raises the likelihood that
American investments in defense modernization will
inadvertently subsidize similar foreign efforts through
espionage and foreign exploitation of U.S. technological designs. The openness of the Third Offset could
fuel the proliferation of these technologies and provide
paths leading to intellectual property loss and corruption of the technology.
Conversely, it would be unwise to assume that a U.S.
decision to pursue a third technological offset will necessarily induce all adversaries to pursue in kind. Faced
with the near impossible costs of attempting to keep
pace in a Third Offset capabilities-race, many actors
will have an incentive to pursue a more affordable
and credible deterrent to U.S. multi-domain superiority. Coupled with the increasing availability of fissile
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material, proliferation of nuclear expertise and infrastructure, and modern technologies, it is likely that the
next 20 years will bring about an expansion of nuclear
powers and global nuclear arsenals. The United States
must pursue Third Offset capabilities with the understanding that our actions will drive and incentivize
continued proliferation of nuclear weapons.
CONCLUSION
Posturing the Army to dominate in 2035 and beyond
will require broad and innovative thinking. The Army
should continue to broaden its thinking about the character of the future force. Simply projecting a variant of
the current force into the future and outfitting it with
new equipment is not intellectually rigorous enough to
fully explore how the future force must operate—nor
will it ensure the future force is prepared for the challenges of the future operational environment.
If the traditional notions of superiority and supremacy in the physical domains have changed, then
new attributes must be described for the future force
because how it operates must change as well. Legacy
attributes of the Army such as flexibility, mobility, and
expeditionary skills may be replaced by new attributes
such as predictive, continuously learning, unknowable, decentralized, and compelling. This new set of
attributes will be enabled by Third Offset capabilities.
The implications of the Third Offset for the Army
should not be dismissed. These technologies have the
potential to change the character of conflict and they
require deliberateness. They are coming, and in many
cases are already here—it is inevitable. How the Army
approaches the Third Offset over the upcoming few
years will set the stage for the next 30 years.
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PART I:
THE THIRD OFFSET

1

CHAPTER 1
THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
AND THE THIRD OFFSET
Adam J. Boyd
Michael Kimball
Researchers
No one gains competitive advantage from letting
technology lead strategic visioning. This is the short road
to parity.1

Describing the future environment is an inexact
and imprecise science—a fool’s errand to many. As
the Danish politician Karl Kristian Steincke wrote,
“It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the
future.”2 Closer to home, U.S. Army Military History Institute Director Dr. Conrad Crane asserts that
the maximum effective range of a future prediction is
20 years or less.3 It is highly likely that we will get it
wrong and fail to adequately mitigate risk, because it
is tempting to paint the future environment as simply
an enhanced version of today with more variables;
such as greater population, more inter-connectedness,
more urbanization, and greater stressors. The strategic
environment is often described as volatile, uncertain,
complex, and ambiguous (VUCA).4 In the near to midterm future, certainly the strategic environment will be
more volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. We
will be more connected than we are now, causing news
and events to propagate at an even faster rate. The
abundance of information will significantly increase
complexity and ambiguity, which will likely result in a
lack of focus in both decision-making and prediction.
3

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) Intelligence Staff Section (G2) compiled
data from a variety of sources, both civilian and military, to develop a possible future operational environment. In this view, all domains are widely contested
by a diverse array of adversaries that appear suddenly
and employ peer or near-peer capabilities—though
sometimes only in narrowly focused areas.
The future operational environment will be characterized
by a high potential for instability driven by the diffusion
of power and technologies among rising regional
states, non-state actors, and increasingly empowered
individuals. Threats, including traditional militaries,
irregular forces, criminal enterprises, groups employing
terrorist tactics, and empowered individuals will
employ hybrid strategies. These strategies will combine
technology, diverse organizations, improvised weapons,
and weapons of mass destruction to deny the initiative to
the U.S. military, increasingly contesting the U.S. in the
air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace domains.5

The operational environment of 2035 and beyond
will include faster, cheaper, and ubiquitous advanced
technologies that shape geography, affect global populations, and enhance the strategic reach of state and
nonstate actors. This increase of globalization and
interconnectedness will drastically change the strategic landscape and challenge accepted norms. The
future environment, conflict, and warfare itself will be
shaped by factors that roughly follow six trend lines:
speed of human interaction, demographics and urbanization, economic disparity, resource competition, science and technology, and strategic posture.6
The global effects of climate change can be interpolated by analyzing the effects of climate change on the
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continent of Africa; it is the canary in the coalmine. The
Africa Center for Strategic Studies notes:
Rising sea levels are expected to inundate coastal cities
including Cape Town, Maputo, and Dar es Salaam. By
2030, Tanzania’s coastal areas could lose more than 7,600
km2 of land, and 1.6 million people will experience annual
flooding.7

The warming seas are also triggering a decline in fish
populations, such that by 2050 fish catches along the
West African coast are likely to drop a staggering 50
percent from 2016. A 30-year drought in the Sahel, the
worst drought in 50 years in Southern Africa, and the
loss of 82 percent of the Mt. Kilimanjaro icecap have
already caused famine and regional migration across
the entirety of the continent.8
Climate change will present already strained states
and systems with further sources of friction from which
they might not recover. Migration and competition for
very scarce resources will exacerbate border conflict
and cause tremendous social and cultural upheaval.
Humanitarian disasters may well become the norm
and governments and civil institutions (even those traditionally considered to be strong and stable) will be
under unrelenting pressure to provide basic services
or risk massive civil unrest—or worse.
Global population will significantly increase over
the coming decades—some estimate as high as 9 billion by 2035—an increase of 25 percent in less than
20 years.9 This explosion will further strain already
scarce resources thus amplifying friction between
the haves and have-nots. An increasing percentage
of the population will migrate to urban areas, which
will cause a staggering expansion of current metropolitan complexes. Demographic shifts are likely as
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diverse populations and communities are drawn to
urban areas because the combination of environmental
changes and the commercialization along with automation in agriculture have reduced rural opportunities. This demographic melting pot, coupled with the
near-instantaneous interaction enabled by the internet
and social media, will amplify and accelerate interaction and conflict between peoples, governments, militaries, and threats.10
In his most recent book, Physics of the Future, physicist, scientist, and predictor Michio Kaku uses the fundamental laws of nature as a filter and then predicts
the future using current technology or prototypes that
are being used today. Kaku then extrapolates to predict the future environment in the near future (present-2030), mid-century (2030-2070), and far future
(2070-2100).11
Some examples of near future technology include:
eyeglasses that will connect to the internet, even contact lenses that might do the same; advances in gene
mapping, and the use of handheld medical scanning
devices; and the emergence of new energy-based economies, through solar or hydrogen energy. Mid-century
examples range from “shape shifting” (using Nano
technology to change the shape of organic and inorganic materials), the use of fusion power to overcome
global warming trends, and possibly even a manned
mission to Mars in an effort to begin terraforming that
planet.12
New technologies have the potential for revolutionary impact on warfighting, enhancing situational
understanding, increasing lethality and reducing (or
radically changing) logistics and support requirements.
Many meaningful technologies will be commercially
available making it possible for potential adversaries
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to gain peer-level capabilities at a fraction of the
developmental cost and time required. Though many
will be unable to achieve parity across all domains and
technology sectors, they likely will be able to surge
and become hyper-capable in a focused area(s) that
provide high impact capabilities in their particular
environment and operations—such as offensive cyber,
cheap swarms of autonomous lethal agents (vehicles/
craft), or sophisticated biological or genomic agents.
Given that the future environment will likely highlight pressured U.S. defense budgets, our adversaries’
easier access to a range of technologies will complicate
the Army’s concept of overmatch when developing the
future force.
Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel introduced the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII) at the
Reagan National Defense Forum in 2014. He offered
the expectation that the initiative would eventually
“develop into a game-changing third ‘offset’ strategy.”13 Specifically, Secretary Hagel indicated that the
initiative would maintain U.S. military dominance by
sustaining its competitive edge in power projection
capabilities, balancing technological innovation with
fiscal reality. Simultaneous with developing new technologies, the military would develop new operational
concepts and new approaches to warfighting to capitalize on these technologies.14 Once realized, the DII
would set the conditions to facilitate a strategy in total,
the Third Offset Strategy, focused on deterrence.
The First Offset Strategy began as President Eisenhower’s New Look Strategy in 1953, when the number
of Soviet divisions outnumbered the U.S. divisions 175
to 92.15 This First Offset capitalized on the technological
advances in the U.S. nuclear arsenal to offset the Soviet
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conventional overmatch, allowing the United States to
reduce its conventional military size and footprint.16
The strategy of nuclear capability and deterrence
continued throughout the Cold War, but began to
wane in the late 1970s.
As Soviet capabilities in both areas increased through the
late 1960s and 1970s, Soviet leaders seemingly had two
advantages to the West’s sole nuclear threat, their own
nuclear forces and the massive red Army.17

The Soviet Union reached nuclear parity, and the
United States realized that it lacked a sufficient,
non-nuclear conventional capability. As a result, U.S.
defense planners began a large conventional-force
modernization program in the late 1970s and early
1980s. In support, the Carter administration fashioned
a strategy to place greater emphasis on conventional
defense capabilities.18
The Second Offset Strategy was originally conceived
in 1977 by then Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, as
well as Andrew Marshall and William J. Perry.19 Secretary Brown and his team looked to improve U.S. military capabilities through the careful combination of
technology and the right systems. William Perry stated
that there was:
the false assumption that [the strategy’s] primary
objective was to use “high technology” to build better
weapon systems than those of the Soviet Union. . . . The
offset strategy was based instead on the premise that
it was necessary to give these weapons a significant
competitive advantage over their opposing counterparts
by supporting them on the battlefield with newly
developed equipment that multiplied their combat
effectiveness.20
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In other words, the Second Offset Strategy was based
on the premise that the combination of technologies
provided the strategic benefit, rather than each technology individually.
This combination of how the technologies could
best be used together would eventually be known as
the AirLand Battle doctrine, demonstrated to great
effect in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. In fact,
the U.S.-led coalition success in Desert Storm served
as its own form of conventional deterrence, displaying
the capability and effectiveness of the U.S. military to
other world adversaries.
The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Air Force General Paul J. Selva offered a more pragmatic description of the Second Offset Strategy in his
comments during the March 2016 Defense Programs
Conference. General Selva suggested that the Second
Offset was really about trading firepower for precision.21 More specifically, General Selva stated that
during the escalation of the First Offset, the Russians
focused on building a nuclear capability centered on
numbers of missiles, thereby having mass in firepower.
The United States realized that it could not keep pace
with the Russians in terms of building warheads and
turned to developing precision in targeting. Coupled
with a robust command and control (C2) architecture,
the precision capabilities of the U.S. military, offset the
sheer numbers of the Russians.
In describing the Third Offset, General Selva has
reflected that we have been reliant on the benefits of
the doctrine of the Second Offset for the better part of
almost 30 years, and that it is time for us to expend
some due diligence on building something for the
future.22 General Selva suggests that we must innovate in technologies, as well as the integration
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of the technologies into operations, formations,
and even doctrine, in order to truly create a Third
Offset Strategy.
The objectives of the Third Offset Strategy are
anchored in a single, core objective: deterrence.
According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert
Work, the focus of the Third Offset Strategy is deterrence directed at the two primary, near-peer adversaries of the United States—Russia and China.23 In a
discussion of the Third Offset, Deputy Secretary Work
highlighted five initial vectors which direct research
and development:
•
•
•
•
•

Autonomous Learning Systems
Human-Machine Collaborative Decision-Making
Assisted Human Operations
Advanced Manned-Unmanned System Operations
Network-Enabled, Cyber and EW Hardened,
Autonomous Weapons And High-Speed Weapons24

Each of these technologies has the potential for significant impacts. However, as the United States develops new capabilities, its adversaries are trying to keep
pace. Given the continually shortened development
timelines, any technological advantages (never mind
overmatch) will likely be short-lived. In some cases,
adversary capabilities may already outmatch U.S.
capabilities and an increase in U.S. capability may only
achieve parity. In order to effectively realize the value
of offset technological overmatch, it will be important for the Army’s Multi-Domain Battle concept to be
informed by Third Offset possibilities so that the technology is nested with a concept; it will not suffice to
simply develop the new technologies as capabilities.
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CHAPTER 2
THE URGENCY OF THE THIRD OFFSET
Samuel R. White, Jr.
We live in a dynamic world, an era of contradictory
trends shaped by two great forces, one strategic, the other
technical—the advent of the Information Age. The scale
and pace of recent change have made traditional means of
defining future military operations inadequate. Change
will continue, requiring our Army to recognize it as the
only real constant.1

Twenty-three years ago, the authors of Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-2 visualized the operational environment of the first quarter
of the 21st century. Even with the information age in
its infancy, there was a premonition that something
big was on the horizon. Technological innovations,
they said, “will revolutionize—and indeed have begun
to revolutionize—how nations, organizations, and
people interact.”2 “Information technology,” they continued, “is expected to make a thousandfold advance
over the next 20 years [1995-2015].”3 The implications
to military operations would be both evolutionary and
revolutionary. Surprisingly, the authors may have
undershot the mark.
Futurist, author, and computer scientist Ray Kurzweil estimates that between 2000 and 2007, technology
advanced 1 million times—and predicts by his “Law
of Accelerating Returns” it will advance a billion times
over the next 30 years.4 Advances will occur exponentially faster as time passes. Progress is accelerating.
During the 21st century, Kurzweil theorizes that we
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will experience 20,000 years of progress in only 100
years (based upon innovation rates of the past). Kurzweil predicts that by 2020, $1,000 will buy a computer
capable of 10 quadrillion calculations per second—
roughly equivalent to the power of a human brain. In
2030, $1,000 will buy a computer that is a thousand
times more powerful than the human brain; by 2045,
that same $1,000 will buy a processor a billion times
more intelligent than every human combined.5
The Internet of Things is real and growing and
everywhere. In December 1995, there were 16 million Internet users in the entire world. In June 2017,
there were about 3.8 billion—and growing every day.
In only 21 years, half the world’s population became
connected.6
The proliferation of technology into everything
will radically change the future military and operational environment. In 2035-2050, the battlespace
will be elongated, deepened, and hyper-connected.
Engagements will occur at home station military bases
through ports of debarkation to tactical assembly areas
all the way to the adversary’s motor pool. From space
to the ocean floor; from military to non-military; from
governmental to nongovernmental; from state to nonstate; from physical to virtual. The operational area
will be wherever effects are generated—and the array
of stimuli that will generate effects is staggering. The
interconnected and global nature of everything will
produce physical and virtual effects that have tremendous range, saturation, and immediacy—along with
daunting complexity and stealth.
More than ever before, the tactical fight will be influenced less by the tactical fighter and more by actors or
organizations either unknown to the warfighters, or
beyond their ability to affect. A hacked and corrupted
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computer server in the Defense Logistics Agency will
have a disproportionally greater impact on a brigade’s
combat readiness than the security of supply routes.
Increased adversary reach and the ubiquitous battlespace in the future will mean U.S. freedom of action
in all domains will be heavily contested and both
sides will take asymmetric cross-domain approaches
to offset overmatch. An advantage in fighter aircraft
quantity and quality will be offset by adversary interdiction of airfields, radar spoofing, and cyber-paralysis of air command and control (C2). Overmatch in
ground combat systems will be offset by multi-domain
deception, cyber-corrupted logistics networks, and
swarms of autonomous lethal and non-lethal weapons. An advantage in strategic mobility will be offset
by formidable anti-access capabilities, sophisticated
information campaigns, and contested deployment
that extend into service members’ homes, families and
private lives.
Adversaries and potential adversaries are investing heavily in capabilities that offset U.S. legacy systems and processes. In 1999, 8 years after end of the
Cold War, the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College’s correlation of forces calculators gave
an M1A2 tank battalion a 63 percent force equivalent
(FE) advantage over a T80 tank battalion; an M2 infantry battalion a 30 percent FE advantage over a Boevaya
Mashina Pehoty (BMP-3 [Infantry Combat Vehicle]) battalion; and, a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS)
battalion a 31 percent advantage over a BM-22 multiple rocket launcher (MRL) battalion (see Table 2-1).7
The 2017 version of the calculator, updated to reflect
current equipment and capabilities, reflects almost
FE parity (+/- 5 percent) between a U.S. armored brigade combat team (ABCT) and a Russian tank brigade
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equipped with T-90 tanks and BMP-3s. The MLRS battalion now has 40 percent less FE compared to a Russian BM-30 Smerch-M MRL battalion and 37 percent
less compared to a Chinese WM-80 MRL battalion (see
Table 2-2).8

U.S. FORCES
Type
Infantry
Battalion
(M2)
Armored
Battalion
(M1A2)
155(SP)
Battalion
(M109A6)
MLRS
Battalion

FE
1.00

U.S.
ADVANTAGE
PERCENTAGE

ADVERSARY
FORCES
Type
Infantry
Battalion
(BMP-3)

FE
0.77

30

1.21

Tank Battalion
(MIB 40xT80)

0.77

57

1.20

2S3 Battalion

0.85

41

4.60

BM 22 Battalion

3.5

31

Table 2-1. 1999 Force Equivalent (FE) Comparison.9
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U.S.
ADVANTAGE
PERCENTAGE

ADVERSARY
FORCES

U.S. FORCES
Type

FE

Type

FE

Infantry
Combined
Arms
Battalion
(M1A2)

37.69

Infantry
Battalion
(BMP-3)

41.12

-9

Armored
Combined
Arms Battalion
(M1A2)

37.24

Tank Battalion
(T-90)

28.01

33

13.08

Field Artillery
Battalion
(Smerch-M/
BM-30)

18.29

-40

Field Artillery
Battalion
(WM-80)

17.95

-37

Tank Brigade
(T-90/BMP-3)

230.49

8

Field Artillery
Battalion
(MLRS)

ABCT (M1A2) 248.99

Table 2-2. 2017 Force Equivalent (FE).10
While not designed to drive requirements or force
structure planning (or to compare dissimilar organizations), FE calculations are a useful tool to get a snapshot
of relative advantage—and by extrapolation—trends
in relative overmatch. Moreover, though comparing
FE for U.S. and adversary armor, infantry, and artillery
units over a period of 17 years is not clean, it does support an assertion that U.S. advantage has been eroded.
Increasing readiness may bring a short-term benefit, but as long as the modernization gap continues
to widen, the U.S. Army will find itself overmatched
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in legacy systems by its traditional competitors—and
counter-matched in emerging asymmetric areas by a
growing number of nontraditional ones.
The absence of sustained overmatch in previously
uncontested physical domains will place U.S. forces
in an unfamiliar position. Supremacy and superiority
in the physical domain will be temporary at best and
unlikely at worst. In the future, the concept of decisive
point may well be different. In fact, a decisive point
may not exist at all—or may have to be created. Lethality and adversary reach will make offensive action less
decisive in some domains. Maneuvering to positions of
advantage may be impossible and the future principles
of war (particularly offensive, mass, and maneuver)
may not apply—or will be fundamentally different.
Future conflict will likely find adversaries fighting to create a narrow window of advantage, taking
action, and then fighting to regain the advantage once
lost (or to gain a different advantage). Each side will be
continually challenged to identify which advantages
to seek, and most importantly, to recognize when the
advantage is gained (and when it is lost). The opportunities for action will be sudden, fleeting, and will
change sides.
The decline of the U.S. Army’s advantage will continue unless the Army and the Department of Defense
(DoD) are creative and innovative in future modernization. They should exercise honest intellectual rigor in
envisioning and developing the future force and avoid
building a future force optimized to solve today’s
problems with today’s organizations—equipped with
tomorrow’s technology. This path will lead to a search
for a better howitzer or tank, rather than to ask the
questions, “What is better than a howitzer?” or “Do
we still need tanks?”
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Mark Cuban’s caution about artificial intelligence
(AI) during an interview at the March 2017 South by
Southwest (SXSW) Conference and Festivals highlights the urgency and impact of Third Offset capabilities and indeed Third Offset thinking:
Whatever you are studying right now if you are not
getting up to speed on deep learning, neural networks,
etc., you lose.11

America’s first multi-millionaires made their fortunes
in the industrial revolution (e.g., Andrew Carnegie,
Cornelius Vanderbilt, George Westinghouse, and
Éleuthère Irénée du Pont); the billionaires in mechanization and mobilization (e.g., Henry Ford, John D.
Rockefeller, J. Paul Getty, Howard R. Hughes, Jr.); and
the mega-multi-billionaires in information technologies and global connectedness (e.g., Bill Gates, Carlos
Slim, Larry Ellison, Jeff Bezos, Mark Zuckerberg). The
world’s first trillionaires, says Cuban, “are going to
come from somebody who masters AI and all its derivatives and applies it in ways we never thought of.”12
The race to develop and apply meaningful and
break-through AI is already at full-throttle, and the
prize for finishing first is significant. The tech industry
giants are investing tens of billions of dollars in their
own AI research and development, and venture capitalists are funding an equal amount for new startup
companies.
This headlong rush has prompted some of the
world’s great minds to acknowledge the inevitability
of advanced AI and go so far as to warn against possible catastrophe. Physicist Dr. Stephen Hawking has
warned that unbridled AI development “could spell
the end of the human race.”13 As recently as July 2017,
tech innovator Elon Musk rattled the nation’s governors at the summer National Governor’s Association
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meeting when he offered that AI is “a fundamental
risk to the existence of civilization.”14 Since January
2017, over 4,600 of the top experts in the AI, robotics,
and scientific fields, to include Google’s DeepMind
founder Demis Hassabis, IMB Watson Chief Scientist Grady Booch, Elon Musk, and Stephen Hawking
signed an open letter as part of the Future of Life Institute’s Asilomar AI Principles. The letter and principles
acknowledge the potential of AI and advocate a framework that guides its beneficial development.15
Pragmatically, these warnings and frameworks
will do little to prevent the militarization of AI. The
rewards are too great and the risk of being second too
severe. Just as industrialization and mechanization
changed the fundamental character of both civilization
and warfare, and they gave an overwhelming advantage to the side that was first, break-through AI could
have a similar (if not exponentially greater) effect. Fivetime Hugo Award winning author, mathematician,
and futurist Vernor Vinge cautioned in 1993, if technological achievement of a “singularity” is possible—that
point at which greater-than-human intelligence drives
runaway progress and models are discarded and a
new reality rules—then that singularity will certainly
happen.
Even if all the governments of the world were to
understand the ‘threat’ and be in deadly fear of it,
progress toward the goal would continue. . . . In fact,
the competitive advantage—economic, military, even
artistic—of every advance in automation is so compelling
that passing laws, or having customs, that forbid such
things merely assures that someone else will get them
first.16

It is not a matter of if the development of AI will
occur, but when—and what form it will take.
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AI—and human-computer interfaces that Vinge
terms intelligence amplification (IA)—offers the Army
opportunities for leap-ahead offset over potential competitors. While advantages in the physical domains
may be brief and few, sustainable decisive advantage
could be gained in the cognitive domain—the boundary-free area of the battlefield that involves knowing, predicting, and deciding. However, while not a
domain in the strictest doctrinal sense, the cognitive
dimension of human (and artificial or amplified) intelligence and organizational perception is a ripe arena
for future conflict. In the future, individuals, teams,
units, and the entire force could operate far more cognitively connected than today— almost as a single cognitive organism. There is great potential for common
understanding, collective decision-making, and unified anticipatory action. Unlike the physical domains,
dominance in the cognitive domain is less vulnerable
to asymmetric offset. Adversaries may attempt to prevent each other from gaining knowledge, but offsetting
the advantage once it is achieved is difficult. Knowledge is not fungible—something is either known or it
is not.
Advantages in the cognitive domain could be deep
and long lasting. In future conflict, ambiguity will
increase despite interconnectedness. The velocity and
scale of activity will make it difficult to discern the
important from the unimportant and what is real from
what is fake. Adversary spoofing, deception, and data
manipulation and corruption will create a common
operational picture that is part-fact, part-fiction.
This murky situational awareness will feed decision
cycles that will be compressed by pervasive data and
near-instantaneous communications.
Decision events will increase in frequency and
speed. The “observe, orient, decide, and act” (OODA)
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loop decision cycle—must be compressed in the shortterm to “recognize, decide, act” (RDA). Observation
and orientation as discrete actions will be a luxury
that the future battlefield will not allow. Superiority
will be predicated on further evolving the decision
cycle to “predict, decide, and act” (PDA)—with the
goal of reducing (or ultimately eliminating) the time to
decide—or “predict and act” (PA)—through automation, AI, and IA.
Predicting will be more important than understanding. In fact, AI/IA could make it possible to
reliably predict without understanding. Accurately
predicting changes to the environment and adversary
actions make it possible to be anticipatory and preemptive—gaining supremacy over the adversary by
eliminating the majority of their options—and then
focusing on countering the option(s) that remain. Limiting adversary options controls outcomes and denies
the adversary the initiative (at a minimum the range
of possible choices are controlled). Conversely, AI/IA
can help retain friendly freedom of action (options).
Increased cognitive reliability and the resultant ability to act appropriately (time and action) can markedly decrease friendly uncertainty and increase the
operational tempo—to a point, adversaries are orders
of magnitude behind in decision cycles and have no
counteraction available.
The pace of advances in AI and IA create an
urgency for the Army. They are areas of intense competition and development by industry as well as by
potential competitors and will be the first-principles
in building a sustainable advantage in the future. If
the future operational environment is markedly different from today, then the attributes of the Army
should be different. Legacy attributes such as mobility
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and versatility are focused on the physical domains,
where any advantage is fleeting and is met with asymmetric counters. Using these legacy attributes solely
to describe the future force belies appreciation of the
future operational environment and the evolving character of warfare and does not fully account for the
probability that AI and IA will make things radically
different. Beyond fielding a force that simply competes
in the physical domains, the Army of 2035 and beyond
must be designed to dominate and achieve overmatch
in the cognitive domain; for the greatest potential for
superiority or supremacy lies here.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMY AND JOINT
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CHAPTER 3
GO AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:
POTENTIAL FOR STRATEGIC
DECISION-MAKING
Charles B. Cain
Researcher
Go is the world’s oldest board game.1 Played on
a square game board with a grid of 19x19 lines, two
players take turns placing black or white stone pieces.
To surround an opposing player’s stones, results in the
capture of those stones. At the end of the game, the
player who surrounds the most space on the board and
has the least captured stones is the winner.2 The overall goal of the game of Go is to apply initiative in order
to maximize one’s own strengths while exploiting an
opponent’s weaknesses to achieve strategic and tactical encirclement. Short of that, it leads to a situation
characterized by stability and balance.
While seemingly simple, Go is amazingly complicated. It is a game of initiative, maneuver, balance, and
a clash of human wills to control the game board geography. Go is essentially a 2,500-year old “abstract war
simulation.”3 Because of this, several prominent political thinkers have suggested that Go is a viable model
for understanding geopolitics and strategy.4 Still, few
know how to apply it to their own decision-making.
They can see Go as illustrative, informative, and even
eye-opening, but are unable or unwilling to take the
next steps and learn what Go teaches in order to apply
it to their own strategic thinking. Teaming humans and
computerized artificial intelligence (AI) is a potential
solution that will allow a human to act like an expert
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at Go or similar decision-making processes, without
the experience or in-depth study otherwise required.
Recent developments in AI show this is now possible.
In 2016, a computer program resoundingly
defeated two of the world’s best Go players. The
program was AlphaGo, written by computer scientists
at Deepmind, a Google-owned AI research company.5
AlphaGo did this, not through pre-programmed
expert knowledge of the game, but by learning from
the games played by expert human players and
improving through self-play.6 This approach is both
revolutionary and wide reaching. While AI will be
useful in many places, its application to the ancient
strategy game of Go shows how it can help improve
foreign and security policy decision-making. Combining the strategic lessons of Go with AI has the potential to make those lessons more broadly applicable and
improve decision-making without requiring a cultural
background or expertise in the game. It will allow
human decision-makers to focus on their strengths
and overcome their cognitive weaknesses. By creating
a model of the world based on a Go framework, an AI
algorithm like AlphaGo can become an expert in that
world, understand a given situation, and then look far
into the future, across many possible courses of action
(COA), to help human decision makers determine
which next move will best meet their objectives. By
teaming with human decision makers to think faster,
deeper, and more accurately, this type of AI can provide a decisive strategic advantage to those most willing to use it.7
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MAN-MACHINE TEAMING FOR
DECISION-MAKING
Moravec’s Paradox states that what humans do
effortlessly can be very difficult for computers.8 This
is especially true with basic tasks like motor skills and
visual or audio recognition. The converse is also true,
especially when it comes to human cognitive thinking.
A complex strategic environment can be (too) difficult
for the human mind to accurately process. There can
be too much information, too much complexity, and
too rapid a change in a situation. However, this is the
exact environment in which strategic decision makers
must operate. They cannot afford to make mistakes or
succumb to the weaknesses inherent in human decision-making. This is what makes man-machine teaming complementary. Teaming an AI computer mind
with the human mind combines human strengths with
AI strengths to offset the weaknesses of both.
Where AI may struggle is when it encounters a situation beyond its learned experience or model. It may
have difficulty thinking creatively beyond its database
or programming. It may not be able to think ethically,
especially in situations where the most ethical solution may not be the most efficient or effective solution.
In addition, AI needs a goal to work toward (AI does
not day-dream). This is where the human part of the
man-machine team comes in. In this model of man-machine teaming, humans will provide objectives, creativity, and ethical thinking, while AI will provide
self-taught experience, intuition, and forecasting abilities. An algorithm with these elements was key to the
breakthrough that enabled AlphaGo to outthink the
world’s best Go player.
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ALPHAGO, AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
BREAKTHROUGH
AlphaGo is an AI breakthrough, different from
many other attempts at game AI. Previous game AI
like International Business Machine’s (IBM) Deep Blue,
a computer that first beat a world chess champion, did
so with very specialized software and hardware.9 It
had large libraries of pre-programmed expert knowledge that it applied using computational brute force.10
However, Go is estimated to be 300 times more complicated than Chess.11 The techniques used by Deep Blue
are impractical for a computer playing Go.
Since pre-programmed expert game knowledge is
impractical for Go, the AlphaGo programmers took a
different route.12 Using deep learning and reinforcement learning artificial with neural networks coupled
to a Monte Carlo Tree Search, AlphaGo was essentially self-taught.13 Using a deep learning artificial
neural network, it studied expert human games and
then used that knowledge to improve itself through
self-play. It developed its own experience, formed a
type of intuition, and used that intuition to focus its
forecasts in order to evaluate a sequence of likely best
moves.14 The algorithm then chose the move with the
highest probability of winning the match.15 In doing
so, it made better game decisions than world’s best Go
players. This was a revolutionary achievement.
The self-learning decision-making algorithm used
by AlphaGo is noteworthy because it does not just
apply to Go—it can extend to other types of decision-making.16 The elements required are a historical
library of data for study and a basic model applicable
to that data for improvement through self-play. Given
relevant data and an applicable model, this process
can be extrapolated from the abstract game of Go to
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real-world strategic decision-making. Then, as computer scientists have noted, “Deep learning has the
property that if you feed it more data, it gets better and
better.”17
GO AND STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING
The same thinking process that makes a mind
(human or AI) successful in a strategic war simulation like Go will make that mind successful in geopolitical strategy. This implies that any strategic leader
would benefit from learning Go and incorporating the
way of thinking that Go stimulates into his or her decision-making framework. Even if unable to learn the
intricacies of the game itself, a basic level of understanding and appreciation for its concepts will enhance decision-making. Additionally, if the Go way of thinking
is integrated into the programming of an AI-assisted
decision-making process, one need not be an expert to
play like an expert. This is the key benefit of man-machine teaming through AI-assisted decision-making.
Go may apply directly in some cases and may serve
as a useful analogy in others. Placing pieces on a Go
board may provide direct insight on where to place
equivalent pieces in the real world. Figure 3-1 shows
an example for Europe and the Middle East.
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Figure 3-1. Go Game Overlaid on Europe and
Middle East Map.18
The left map shows a constructed position based on
a notional map of relative influence in Europe and the
Middle East. White represents the United States and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), black
Russia and Russian allies. The map on the right shows
the results of a relatively simple Go computer program,
much less sophisticated than AlphaGo, playing both
black and white positions through computer self-play.
While this very basic Go model has several limitations, computer self-play does imply strategic benefits
to Russia by applying additional influence activity in
the Middle East, North Africa, and Northern Europe.
It also highlights that the United States and NATO
should strengthen their own influence throughout
Europe and into the Middle East. This simple experiment illustrates the promise and applicability of Go as
a basis for understanding and making decisions in a
strategic environment.
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STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING THROUGH
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Like AlphaGo, a decision-making AI tool would be
composed of three minds. The first is the experience
mind, based on an artificial neural network trained by
history, doctrine, and examples from human strategists, able to recognize expert moves in a given area.
The second is an intuition mind, formed by an artificial
neural network trained through reinforcement learning, based on a relevant game model, and able to tell
a winning position from a losing one, using a reward
function based on a human-specified goal or objective.
The third, a forecasting mind, would use the experience
and intuition minds to narrow down possible options,
forecast multiple possible future sequences of events,
and make recommendations to meet given objectives.
The first two minds would always be learning. The
experience mind would receive continuous updates of
news, intelligence, and other relevant information. The
intuition mind would continue to improve through
reinforcement learning self-play and reward criteria that could update as objectives change. The forecasting mind would continue to run simulations and
update probabilities of success as a situation develops.
It would continuously extend the decision tree to cover
more actions that are possible and improve the fidelity
of previous estimates. Much like human strategic decision-making, the overall concept is a continuous cycle
of evaluation and improvement.19
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APPLICATIONS FOR AI-ASSISTED
DECISION-MAKING
The basic approach for any application would be
to create a simulation (game model) for the situation,
to define success criteria, and then build and train a
neural network for that simulation. AI-assisted decision-making could help leaders at all levels rapidly
design, plan, and evaluate operations. Planners could
test multiple operational approaches against a realistic
AI-based adversary. Through a continuous deliberative planning process, the AI could update and evaluate the plans against the operational environment. The
AI would continuously monitor the environment and
warn planners when assumptions are no longer valid
or if there is an opportunity to improve the plans.
Another application would be an AI-assisted
common operating picture (COP).20 It would catalog
and display a disposition of friendly and enemy forces,
automatically built and updated through a big data
approach. Despite incomplete intelligence, an AI-supported COP could tell where an enemy should be with
a corresponding level of confidence. In real-time, the
AI would continuously interpret the situation, explore
multiple lines of effort, and determine which is most
likely to meet the given success criteria.
Based on this, the COP would recommend next
actions and predict likely enemy responses. A commander could rapidly explore the situation and various COA, choosing hypothetical actions to see what
the AI thinks would be a likely enemy response. In a
complicated, multi-domain, anti-access area-denial
future operating environment, this type of AI would
find and predict “windows of superiority” for friendly
forces to exploit.21 It would show threat avoidance
routing and recommend an optimized multi-domain
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fires tasking order. Essentially, this is a real-time situational awareness tool coupled to a forecasting, realtime, and AI-driven war game.
RECOMMENDATIONS
As part of the Third Offset Strategy, the Department of Defense (DoD) should fund research and development that will enable AI-supported human-machine
teaming for strategic decision-making. Additional
efforts should experiment with integrating AI into
decision-making processes at all echelons. These
efforts should be incremental, demonstrating basic
capabilities before attempting more complicated ones.
The DoD and military services should begin a rapid
prototyping effort to determine which aspects of AI
can achieve the most near-term success. They should
fund groups of programmers, strategists, and wargaming experts to explore what is possible with this
AI-assisted decision-making approach. Research into
man-machine teaming processes should determine
the best way to integrate, train with, and scale these
AI tools. Organizations that would use these AI tools
should apply change management principles to incorporate them into their processes and culture.
The true power of AI will be in the teaming of
the human mind with the AI mind. This type of
man-machine teaming will combine human strengths
of goal-setting, creativity, and ethical thinking with
AI strengths of rational thought through self-taught
experience, intuition, and deep forecasting. A decision-making process that incorporates man-machine
teaming through self-learning AI will overcome the
weaknesses inherent in human decision-making and
give those who use it a unique and decisive advantage
over those who do not. This could be used to create
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a real-time, forecasting COP that could advise a decision maker on the next best move, while predicting the
likely moves of an adversary. It could help strategists
at all levels rapidly plan operations and quickly update
those plans as facts change. In the end, by teaming with
human decision makers to think faster, deeper, and
more accurately, this type of AI will provide a decisive
strategic advantage to those most willing to use it.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE
THIRD OFFSET
Adam Z. Walton
Researcher
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) technology
innovation initiative, also known as the Third Offset,
seeks to provide a framework for the development of
next generation technologies to offset parity achieved
by our nearest peer competitors. Named due to its relationship to two previous technological eras, nuclear
weapons (1950s) and stealth and precision strike
(1970s), the Third Offset is designed to provide the
United States assurance of dominance on the future
battlefield. Although nuclear weapons have played an
enduring role in our national security strategy throughout both of the previous offsets, the role of our nuclear
deterrent in the Third Offset remains unclear. Failure
to account for this role while developing Third Offset
capabilities and constructs that are not properly integrated with our existing nuclear deterrent has potential to result in deterrence shortfalls. The aim of this
chapter is to analyze the previous and current roles of
our nuclear deterrent, with the goal of assessing the
future role of nuclear weapons within the Third Offset
construct. In the end, the pursuit of Third Offset technologies, while having potential to politically supplant
our existing nuclear stockpile, provides our adversaries significant incentive to pursue their own nuclear
weapons capabilities. The United States must consider
this fact at all stages going forward.
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THE THIRD OFFSET
The Third Offset is both an organizational and
operational construct, enabled by key technologies,
designed to provide conventional deterrence of great
power competitors.1 While Pentagon leadership has
consistently stated that the Third Offset is not about
any one technology, they have acknowledged there is
a strong technology component.2
In 2009, then-President Barack Obama announced
that U.S. policy would be to “seek the peace and
security of a world without nuclear weapons.”3 This
declaration has provided the underpinnings of U.S.
nuclear policy in the years since. The Nuclear Posture
Review Report 2010 identified the reduction of the role
of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy,
largely by increasing conventional deterrence capabilities, as one of five key objectives of U.S. nuclear policy
and posture.4 In this respect, the Third Offset initiative
supports these deterrence aims. By emphasizing conventional deterrence in the Third Offset, the United
States is signaling their commitment to the Prague initiatives. By creating a construct, or technology, more
attractive than nuclear weapons (from a deterrence
perspective) it may seem possible to wean the world’s
great powers from their nuclear requirements. Deputy
Secretary Work furthers this notion:
Our advantage is, and this is an enduring advantage,
the thing that I know is that if we force, for example,
an adversary who is an authoritarian power to adopt
the organizational and operational concepts that this
will cause, it will cause changes in their military and
ultimately in their society that will make it less likely that
we will fight against each other.5
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Part of the offsetting quality of the Third Offset is the
U.S. ability to change and adapt capabilities more rapidly than our adversaries can counter. If successful,
the logical course for an adversary would be to mimic
this innovation cycle to preempt U.S. advantages. The
result of this competition becomes an innovation arms
race where victory goes to the side that anticipates and
adapts the quickest. Since private industry is key to
success in this competition, an adversary must be able
to leverage and access private partners. Secretary Work
postulates that the only way to support these private
institutions would be for adversaries to adopt military
and societal reforms similar to the United States under
the Third Offset Strategy. His postulate is based on one
key premise—that the U.S.-model democratic society
is the only type that can support such an innovation
cycle.
This theory poses an interesting question for an
adversary, who either cannot or is not willing to engage
in the innovation arms race. If one assumes that the lack
of participation is based upon fiscal resources, then a
would-be adversary would be obliged to pursue the
most economical means possible to deter perceived or
real U.S. aggression. Ironically, nuclear weapons represent a relatively inexpensive, accessible, and proven
military deterrent. These weapons are potentially the
only means capable of countering dramatically “offset”
future U.S. power.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOW AND IN THE
FUTURE
The U.S. military thinking on nuclear weapons
is shaped by both the Cold War “peace dividend”
and 15 years of counterterror and counterinsurgency
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operations. For the previous 8 years, as set out in
former President Obama’s Prague address, the United
States has pursued an approach to nuclear weapons that has been largely based upon addressing the
threats of nuclear proliferation, the threat of terror
actors obtaining a nuclear device, and the consequences of nuclear mishap or accident.6 This approach
unwittingly requires an assumption that nuclear states
are unlikely or unwilling to engage in a nuclear conflict. It also assumes that the world remains unipolar,
with a dominant U.S. hegemony engaged in conflict
with nonstate actors as it has been for much of the past
2 decades. Overall, the prospect of deliberate nuclear
use has been marginalized largely through a U.S. lens
that reflects a lack of political willpower to do so.
The role of nuclear weapons in the future operating
environment of 2035 has potential to be elevated by the
increasing incentives for developing nations to pursue
nuclear power. Global concerns over the role of fossil
fuels and climate change will likely lead to an increased
demand for nuclear power, not only for economic reasons, but also for political status and prestige.7 Countries with declared intent to develop nuclear power
programs by 2035 include: Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates, Jordan, Turkey, Algeria, and Egypt.8 The
widespread proliferation of peaceful nuclear power
also permits the propagation of knowledge, expertise,
and infrastructure capable of supporting a nuclear
weapons program as a byproduct, and potentially clandestine, industry. Consider, for example, that under
international protocols it is within acceptable statistical error limits for a commercial nuclear fuel plant to
lose track of hundreds of pounds of plutonium per
year, enough for dozens of nuclear warheads.9 Efforts
to contain illicit weapons development will be further

48

complicated by the dual use nature of the technologies
involved. This will require stringent application of nonproliferation protocols in order to contain the spread
of weapons-usable material and related technologies.
States capable of crossing the threshold from nuclear
power to nuclear arms will likely use these weapons as
a deterrent to regional aggressors as well as a means to
offset the various, and prohibitively expensive, technological advantages of the world’s great powers.
The future role of nuclear weapons in the strategies
of our near peer competitors is unlikely to decline. In
contrast to U.S. efforts to decrease the role of nuclear
weapons in its foreign policy, Russia sees its nuclear
arsenal as central to retention of its power, prestige, and
influence in the world.10 Over the past 20 years, Russian nuclear use doctrine has shifted away from exclusive use as a deterrent in global and regional conflict
to now including applications of tactical nuclear munitions in small conflicts, including local wars, against
potentially non-nuclear opponents, including terrorism.11 Further, the use of tactical nuclear weapons is
seen as the primary and only means to counterbalance
U.S. advantages in conventional capabilities gained by
stealth and precision munition technologies.12 Russian
objections to U.S.-sponsored missile defense capabilities in Eastern Europe are based largely on the fact
that these would erode the effectiveness of the critical
balance they attempt to achieve with tactical nuclear
weapons.13
Much less is understood about China’s nuclear
intent and aspirations. Despite having much smaller
nuclear arsenals than either Russia or the United
States, the actual size of China’s nuclear arsenal is in
debate. Most analysts infer that China maintains a
stockpile of up to 300 warheads, however, some assess
that the number may be nearly 6 times greater due,
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in part, to estimated production quantities of uranium and plutonium.14 These assessments are further
obscured by China’s construction of nearly 3,000 miles
of tunnels used to protect and conceal its nuclear arsenal.15 China openly claims a no-first-use policy; however, it has repeatedly indicated that it would consider
use of nuclear weapons in the event of U.S. conventional intervention in a conflict with Taiwan.16 In this
scenario, China’s policy of escalation with regard to
regional conflicts is similar to Russia’s policy.
India and Pakistan use their nuclear capabilities
to offset each other in their regional conflicts. Israel
maintains an ambiguous capability to ensure survival
from an existential threat. North Korea leverages a
portfolio of weapons of mass destruction, including a
fledgling nuclear capability, to deter and complicate
U.S. military action aimed to overthrow a dictatorial
regime. Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons was presumably based on the demonstrated successes of Russian and North Korean programs in deterring U.S.
military action. It remains uncertain when, or if, Iran
will decide to resume work on their nuclear weapons
program. Given current world nuclear-posturing, it
seems improbable that pursuit of a U.S. Third Offset
would alter the security calculations of these nuclear
weapons states.
NUCLEAR IMPLICATIONS OF THE THIRD
OFFSET
In light of the United States pursuit of a Third
Offset Strategy, Russia in particular is faced with the
proposition of a widening conventional capability gap.
In response, Russia is anticipated to pursue a policy
of “countering the Third Offset Strategy with the First
Offset Strategy.”17 These efforts include expansive
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modernization efforts that include a variety of delivery
platforms designed, in part, to ensure the resiliency of
the Russian nuclear force. Thus, an unintended consequence of U.S. conventional capability growth under
the Third Offset is the expanded reliance on nuclear
weapons of a near peer competitor that uses it to hedge
its bet in the race for offsetting technology.
As the United States moves toward the Third
Offset, we must acknowledge our own reluctance to
maintain a robust nuclear deterrent and the inherent
predisposition toward developing conventional alternatives to their use. This phenomenon is rooted in the
evolution of a “nuclear taboo” over the past 70 years
that has driven U.S. political will to form a distaste for
all things nuclear.18 The causes of this taboo are rooted
in “domestic public opinion, world opinion . . . and
personal conviction informed by beliefs about American values and conceptions of the appropriate behavior of civilized nations.”19 As a result, we deliberately
describe the Third Offset as a conventional endeavor
thus concretely reinforcing the status of this taboo and
signaling U.S. desire to remove the nuclear equation
from the future of warfare. This taboo serves to incentivize the development of conventional capabilities
in the form of a Third Offset. The U.S. reluctance to
maintain nuclear dominance in favor of a conventional
approach creates an opportunity for adversaries to
redouble efforts to obtain nuclear power status in an
attempt to fill the vacuum created by the U.S. departure from the nuclear arena.
As the United States launches on its Third Offset
journey, we must consider potential adversary actions
in response to our offset pursuits. One response could
be to copy or counter our new capabilities. This would
likely be part of the approach of great power peercompetitors with access to technologies and the
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capital required to engage in such an arms race.
Following too fast, however, generates risk of large
sunk financial costs into risky technologies that may fail
to provide an offset or real deterrent. A prudent adversary will seek to hedge these pursuits with a proven
and fiscally obtainable deterrent. Despite efforts to
modernize its conventional forces, it is unlikely that
Russia will abandon or ignore its nuclear arsenal and
both the political and military power it provides.
Additionally, while the Third Offset focuses on offsetting a peer adversary, the United States cannot ignore
the impact on smaller and emerging threat actors and
states. Faced with the near impossible costs of attempting to keep pace in a Third Offset, these actor nations
will have incentive to pursue an affordable and credible deterrent to U.S. multi-domain superiority. Coupled with the increasing availability of fissile material,
proliferation of nuclear expertise and infrastructure,
and modern technologies, it is likely that the next 20
years will bring about continued expansion of global
nuclear arsenals.
It would be irresponsible to assume that a U.S. decision to pursue a third technological offset will necessarily induce an adversary to pursue in kind. Likewise,
it is equally unwise to assume that an adversary will
continue to pursue Second Offset technologies while
watching the United States gain overwhelming advantages in emerging Third Offset capabilities. In this analysis, it is most logical that an adversary pursues the best
offset that it can afford—one that delivers the greatest
and most proven (or perceived) deterrence. Thus, the
First Offset remains an integral, and potentially the
most significant, part of an adversary’s deterrent to U.S.
aggression. It is likely that the pursuit of Third Offset
technologies, while having potential to supplant our
existing nuclear stockpile, provides our adversaries
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significant incentive to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities, a fact that U.S. leadership must consider at all
stages going forward. As such, the United States must
pursue the Third Offset armed with the understanding
that our actions will drive and incentivize continued
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
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CHAPTER 5
SWARMS IN THE THIRD OFFSET
Christopher M. Korpela
Researcher
BACKGROUND
During the 2017 Super Bowl 51 half-time performance, Intel demonstrated the control of 300 drones;
a few months earlier Intel had set a new record with
500 drones controlled by a single operator. Just a year
earlier, the Advanced Robotic Systems Engineering
Laboratory at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, held the record with 50 simultaneous
airborne unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) controlled
by a single operator. In October of 2016, the U.S. military conducted the largest deployment ever of microswarms. Dubbed the Perdix micro drone, these small,
inexpensive, battery-powered, propeller-driven air
vehicles were launched by three F/A-18 Super Hornets. Given the pace of advance, 500 drones will quickly
increase to 1,000 and 10,000 agents in just a few short
years while being scalable, adaptable, distributed, and
collective.
The Third Offset advances the enabling capabilities of swarm behavior that could be wholly adopted
in the future force. This chapter will provide an overview of swarms and explore three major areas relevant
to understanding the degree to which the Department
of Defense (DoD) should pursue research, development, and procurement of swarm capable intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and low-cost,
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numerous, unmanned, and fast weapon systems. The
first area includes swarm initiatives that could allow
the DoD to transition away from expensive, heavy,
and human-centric weapons platforms such as legacy
tanks, manned fighters, and submarines. Second, the
advent of self-driving vehicles, automated logistics,
and aerial drones in the commercial sector could translate to autonomous supply trains, reduced soldier
fatigue and error, and targeting missions in the military. Third, adversaries from both state and nonstate
actors are pursuing swarm capabilities and autonomous weapons. While swarms offer many potential
advantages and the potential to achieve overmatch
with future adversaries, there is significant risk with
a rapid adoption of unproven technologies and the
many legal and ethical issues associated with autonomous weapons.
SWARMS
A swarm is a collection of agents (either homogeneous or heterogeneous) that can coordinate and
adapt its activity to achieve an overall goal or direction.1 Nature has many examples of swarming behavior—e.g., ant colonies, beehives, and termite nests.
Typically, swarms in nature involve homogenous
groups where single agents outside of the group
cannot attempt to accomplish the same task as the
whole. Further, the direction or collective task of the
swarm is not orchestrated by a centralized leader but
rather by simple rules followed by all of the individual agents. Elements within the swarm have little to no
knowledge or ability to communicate with other elements that are not its immediate neighbor.2
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In contrast, robotic swarms could involve centralized control, distributed control, or at a minimum
overall task knowledge in the event that the human
operator loses communications with any of the
agents.3 These swarms can have near-perfect knowledge of their neighbors through the use of wireless
communications (uncontested frequency spectrum)
or on-board sensors such as vision and ranging payloads in a contested spectrum. Processing power and
sensor packages should continue to increase in capabilities such that a swarm will be able to execute mission objectives even if there is no communication with
the human operator or within elements of the swarm
itself. Swarm agents that are within line of sight may
still be able to sense neighbors if communications are
jammed or unavailable.
Robotic swarms do have similarities with nature in
that they leverage autonomy and favor quantity with
the typical sacrifice in quality.4 Unmanned systems
can have reduced weight, size, and design complexity
that may in turn reduce their overall cost. Countering
a swarm may prove difficult for any adversary, including the United States. Swarm agents that can react to
enemy defenses faster and in a distributed manner
may saturate adversary capabilities. Perhaps the most
significant benefit to a swarm mentality is the focus on
small size, which can be more deployable and easier to
logistically sustain.
SWARM INITIATIVES
Future warfare will include operations that occur
in large, densely populated, costal megacities. Over
half of the world’s population currently resides in
urban areas and that percentage will likely increase

57

drastically over the next 25 years. The DoD recognizes
that the rise of megacities increases the likelihood that
future battles are urban. Therefore, the DoD swarm
initiatives across all services are integrating the technology with man-unmanned teaming mechanisms to
allow soldiers the ability to control swarm systems.
One recent example is the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency’s Offensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics
(OFFSET) program that seeks to overcome the difficulties in managing and interacting with hundreds
of swarm agents.5 Focused on urban environments,
OFFSET involves swarm tactic implementation using
combinations of unmanned air and ground robots. In
its early stages, OFFSET aims to bring swarm system
integrators (akin to an end-to-end operating system
like iOS or Android) and swarm tactic sprinters (application developers) together to realize 100, 150, and 250
agent swarms together with an intuitive user interface for squad-sized elements on the ground. The services are all heavily invested in swarm research and
development.
The field of aerial swarms has seen great advances
just in the past few years with movement from out
of the laboratory environment to outdoor experiments with tens to hundreds of vehicles. Society is
in the infancy in swarm development. This technology will have a profound impact on the global economy, commerce, transportation, safety, and efficiency.
Two industries that are changing the landscape are
self-driving automobiles and commercial unmanned
aerial systems (UAS). It is likely that the self-driving
car industry will provide much of the underlying technological advances in swarm autonomy and capability.
Advances in collision avoidance, parking assistance,
and congestion detection and re-routing are already
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improving safety and efficiency. In commercial UAVs,
the factors that allow almost anyone to build a quadcopter for under $100 could enable thousands and tens
of thousands of small to medium sized drones simultaneously controlled by a single operator in the next 5
to 10 years. The commercial sector is already poised to
leverage these technologies.
Low-cost, asymmetric threats have proven dangerous for U.S. military forces and homeland security.
The proliferation of improvised explosive devices of
all types in the Iraqi and Afghan theaters has demonstrated that inexpensive, commercial off-the-shelf
technology, and some electronics knowledge can be
combined to significantly impact high tech operations.
Autonomous Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided
and semi-autonomous UAVs are changing the paradigm in their employment now and in the future.
While a single attack might be insignificant, a swarm
of robotic devices could prove a credible threat. Wired
magazine reported that the Department of Homeland
Security pitted $5,000 worth of drones against a convoy
of armored vehicles, and the drones won.6 In addition
to state actors developing swarm capabilities, nonstate
actors, such as the Islamic State, are doing the same.
THE RISK OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
SYSTEMS (AWS) AND SWARMS
Swarms and autonomous weapons systems (AWS)
offer potential advantages in future warfare but also
present many legal and ethical challenges in addition
to the inherent risk in turning over decision-making
to machines. The literature contains many examples
of legal and ethical considerations with AWS.7 There
are also many petitions from individuals, states,
and nongovernmental organizations supporting an
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international ban on “killer robots.”8 The level of risk
and probability of unexpected or errant behavior (collateral damage or the inability to control the AWS once
enabled) is perhaps the greatest concern. If an AWS
engages and kills civilians, then who is responsible?
What role does the military perform in making ethical decisions if machines and algorithms are executing
them? Autonomous agents in close proximity to adversarial agents could quickly escalate a conflict without
a human involved in the decision. The current debate
within the DoD is the “Terminator Conundrum” and
given the potentials risks of AWS, the DoD should not
develop them.9 However, U.S. adversaries do not have
the same hesitations with AWS and could achieve a
decisive advantage in the future. Therefore, the debate
does not necessarily lie with whether or not to develop
AWS as much as deciding what aspects of warfare to
automate and those to leave in control by humans.
Many of these decisions will involve a scenario where
there is a loss of communications with the AWS and
how much autonomy is provided to engage targets of
opportunity and the ability and authority of the AWS
to defend itself if attacked.
RECOMMENDATIONS
First, the Army should adopt a “swarm mindset.”
This change would largely be seen in the movement
away from the single, exquisite weapons platforms to
those that are small, cheap, unmanned, expendable,
and fast. There are many operational advantages of
swarms in terms of autonomy, quantity, and speed.
Unmanned systems can take greater risk by reducing
survivability while maintaining lethality and increasing deployability. A swarm mindset could lead to
reduced costs and could potentially avoid extensive
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research, development, and long acquisition cycles as
with current weapons platforms.
Second, DoD Directive 3000.09 should be re-evaluated and relaxed. In almost every case, the technology far outpaces the policy. Swarms do not allow for
any meaningful human control over individual agents.
These agents will make targeting decisions once they
are deployed. While the “Terminator Conundrum”
continues to be debated in the Pentagon, it is already
apparent that our adversaries are developing, improving, and integrating autonomous weapons into their
doctrine and force structure.10 The DoD should continue to monitor AWS development by Russia, China,
violent extremist organizations, and others. Swarm-capable systems will not realistically allow control at the
agent level and policy should be adapted to account
for this reality.
Finally, the Army should increase research and
development spending on swarm capable systems,
sensing, and command and control (C2) mechanisms.
Acquisition programs should be tailored to rapidly
develop and field these devices. The Army should continue to leverage academia and commercial innovations in self-driving cars and commercial UAS among
other private sector initiatives.
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CHAPTER 6
GAME OF DRONES:
STRATEGIC UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS
(UAS) COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)
Christopher J. Nemeth
Researcher
Unmanned aerial systems (UAS), while not a new
capability, have increased in importance during the
operations since 2001 due to their great persistence and
ability to change from an intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) platform to a precise kinetic
asset in a matter of seconds. The military operations
tempo over the past 16 years has been unrelenting,
and there has been little opportunity to institutionally change how UAS are employed. Emerging Third
Offset capabilities and innovative new procedures can
innovate how strategic UAS can better serve all of the
geographic combatant commanders (GCC).
Discussion in this section is limited to the strategic UAS, specifically the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-1C Gray
Eagle, MQ-9 Reaper, and follow-on aircraft that share
their attributes. These three UAS have similar capabilities as beyond line of sight, persistent attack platforms
that are optimized for high fidelity ISR, but are also
able to be switched to an attack role when needed.
Since their inception 20 years ago, the Air Force
MQ-1 and later the MQ-9 have experienced tremendous growth. From 1 combat air patrol (CAP) in 2001
to 12 in 2006, the growth still was not enough to supply
the combatant commander’s (CCDR) demand for
more ISR.1 In 2011, the Air Force fielded 50 CAPs and
was directed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to
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increase to 65 by the end of 2013, commenting, “more
remains to be done.” In the same memorandum, Gates
also suggested 65 CAPs is a “temporary plateau in
progress toward an even greater enduring requirement.”2 As capacity continues to increase, the demand
is already present. At a Pentagon press briefing in
2016, Air Force Chief of Staff, General Mark Welsh told
reporters the Air Force would reach 70 CAPs within
a year and a half.3 Furthermore, the Department of
Defense (DoD) will increase to a total of 90 CAPs by
2019.4 That total is represented by Air Force, Army,
and contractor operated aircraft. It is clear that the services are increasing capacity by increasing means. In
conjunction with increasing quantities, the opportunity is ripe to examine and adjust how the UAS are
controlled and utilized by the services.
Command and control (C2) of airpower is a relatively straightforward concept. A GCC is allocated air
domain assets to accomplish the mission. The CCDR
designates a joint force air component commander
(JFACC) to conduct joint air operations in the theater.
The JFACC is critical to unity of command and unity
of effort of air assets in a given area of responsibility (AOR).5 The JFACC tasks subordinate commanders through an air tasking order, which integrates air
assets to fulfill CCDR intent. Through decentralized
execution, the subordinate commanders determine the
details of specifically how to accomplish the tasking.
This construct allows airpower “to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat.”6 According to
Joint Publication 3-30, “UASs should be treated similarly to manned systems with regard to the established
doctrinal warfighting principles.”7 However, should
they?
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Strategic UAS have grown tremendously since their
early stages of use in 2001, but the concept of operations is largely unchanged; it is simply bigger. MQ-1s
and MQ-9s have flown over 3 million hours, of which,
2.8 million hours has been combat. The construct has
worked because the preponderance of assets has been
allocated to one combatant command—Central Command (CENTCOM).8 As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Joseph Dunford pointed out, “Conflicts are very quickly going to spread across multiple
combatant commanders [CCDRs], geographic boundaries, and functions.”9 Does the current C2 architecture
of allocating UAS to an individual CCDR leverage the
key advantages UAS provide? General Dunford suggests not. “We have grown ISR [by] 1,200 percent since
2001, we have grown it 600 percent since 2008. We are
currently meeting 35 percent of the stated demand. We
cannot buy our way out of this problem.”10
The current C2 system makes sense with traditional weapons systems. Once an asset is physically in
an AOR, it is not feasible to move it to regularly task
to another AOR. The inherent agility of strategic UAS
is limited by the rigidity of the legacy C2 construct.
“Any future conflict will be transregional and multifunctional,” according to General Dunford.11 The current organization does not recognize key differences
between a weapons system that must be in a theater in
its entirety versus a weapons system that can be distributed amongst all theaters every day. As situations
arise around the world, our organizational construct
hampers UAS innate capabilities as a global force
multiplier.
The strategic UAS offer many advantages in today’s
complex fight. They give our civilian leaders options
for limited warfare with negligible risk to U.S. troops.

65

For the CCDRs, they present invaluable real-time intelligence akin to watching high definition television and
sensors that collect a wide range of signals intelligence.
They also offer persistence of the target area and multirole flexibility to strike if the rules of engagement
allow. These traits created an evolution in U.S. warfare in a permissive environment, allowing tracking
of high-value targets and finishing with a precision
strike upon meeting defined criteria. Granted there
are numerous vulnerabilities, such as the inability to
operate in a contested environment, potential susceptibility to cyber and electronic warfare attack, and
manpower and frequency spectrum intensity to name
a few. However, the real game-changing technology is
not in development, it is one the U.S. Armed Forces
utilize but are simply not taking full advantage. That
technology is called remote split operations (RSO).
RSO allows the unmanned aircraft to be launched
and recovered by a small footprint of personnel and
equipment where the aircraft is forward-based. The
aircraft is then “passed” (via satellite or other over
the horizon communication) to an aircrew located in
sanctuary. The mission aircrew flies the aircraft for the
duration of the tactical mission, accomplishing all mission tasks until it returns the aircraft and “passes” it
back to the forward-based aircrew for landing.12 This
description of RSO, while technologically impressive,
serves more to minimize U.S. footprint and political
complications across the globe. The game-changing
characteristic of RSO involves the flexibility of the mission cockpit to be located anywhere. A single cockpit
can control any strategic UAS, anywhere in the world,
any time. Even with today’s technology, the possibilities are staggering. For example, a cockpit tasked to
fly a UAS in support of the CENTCOM AOR may be
re-tasked to support a higher priority mission in the
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Africa Command (AFRICOM) AOR. Assuming there
is an aircraft available to fly; the same cockpit can take
control of the AFRICOM aircraft. This example is illustrative, that no “iron” needs to move because of the
inherent distributed nature of the strategic UAS. The
possibilities are endless when technological growth
in capabilities such as auto land, vertical takeoff and
land, and carrier launch and recovery are factored in.
In addition, the services associated with the strategic UAS, the Army, and the Air Force utilize them
differently. Largely, the organizational construct
previously described applies to the Air Force, which
bases the majority of its unmanned aircraft overseas
with a small contingent of forward-based rotational
aircrew and maintenance personnel. The missions are
exclusively controlled via RSO and are flown in support of a GCC. In stark contrast, the majority of the
Army’s Gray Eagles operate organically to support
the brigade combat teams. The Army UAS support
the ground commander and provide assured support
to the maneuver commander.13 The UAS are generally
controlled by cockpits in the theater in which they are
flown.
The Army operates differently from the Air Force
for logical reason. Unity of command and effort and
the associated synergy are more easily achieved when
the UAS are assigned to the ground commander. Integration is simpler and effective when the unit trains,
deploys, and redeploys together. It is a fundamental
difference in Army and Air Force culture and doctrine.
The Army historically invested more in small, tactical
UAS, controlled via remote control to provide overwatch and scout for the ground unit.14 These aircraft fit
well into the Army organic paradigm. They are inexpensive, expendable, and fly below theater coordinating altitudes. Later, when much larger, more capable
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Gray Eagles were acquired, the same concept of operations was applied. Of equal importance to integration
is surety. By assigning all UAS organically, regardless
of capability, the fear of not receiving support from the
strategic UAS is alleviated. The majority of operations
are in the CENTCOM AOR, and the tempo has been
such that the relatively small numbers of Gray Eagles
have been well-employed. However, as demand for
persistent ISR grows globally, the Army structure is
limiting and unnecessarily constrains their inherently
distributed systems.
At the operational level, strategic UAS platforms
operate with agility. They provide the commander
with all the attributes of agility through persistence and
multirole capability. The UAS can loiter in a theater for
nearly a full day and have the range to be re-tasked
great distances while airborne to cover a wide variety of missions. They deliver options with minimal
risk of life. However, at the strategic level, the command function fails to provide agility to the CCDRs as
a whole and also fails to capitalize on the advantages
RSO offers. Responsiveness is severely lacking at the
strategic level, the technology gives the opportunity
for global response within hours, but the command
structure is not responsive enough to take advantage
of global windows of opportunity.
Tactically, strategic UAS share much in common
with fighter aircraft. They are both equipped with sensors capable of providing battlefield awareness to the
joint air operations center (JAOC) with the ability to
employ kinetic effects if needed. However, at the strategic level, UAS share more in common with the global
mobility enterprise’s aircraft (airlift and tanker) than
fighters do. While not intuitive because of the UAS
tactical capabilities, the inherent limits of capacity to
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global demand and their range bear greater resemblance to air mobility assets.
Strategic UAS would flourish in a similar system
of operations under a functional CCDR, where forward-based aircraft, equipment, and personnel can
be strategically positioned at forward operating bases
along the seams of the geographic boundaries of the
GCCs. Conceivably, a small number of these aircraft
could reach almost anywhere in the world if positioned correctly. Strategic UAS can have the effect of
being everywhere at once with RSO; a single cockpit at
one location can essentially take control of any strategic UAS in the world. Strategic UAS require a system
that takes advantage of their global agility, effectively
balances the global demand, and has clearly defined
C2 relationships. A functional command would bring
unity of effort and garner lessons learned with the ability to adapt and improve to any situation worldwide.
The structure would give the appearance that aircraft
are everywhere simultaneously, when in reality it
would be a highly choreographed, agile C2 system.
Now is the time to implement changes to the strategic UAS community. The technology was rapidly
fielded to answer an urgent operational need. The systems have grown from one CAP to over 60 CAPs in
just over 15 years, going from niche to a staple in the
CCDR’s plans. The call for innovation through the Third
Offset Strategy is ideal to reform a disjointed enterprise with vast potential. In April 2008, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates frustratingly observed, “Because
people were stuck in old ways of doing business, it’s
been like pulling teeth,” with respect to increasing
ISR assets in CENTCOM.15 Nine years later, a meansbased solution of increased inventories remains the
solution in attempting to satiate all the GCCs’ requirements. The DoD is demanding innovation to maintain
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asymmetric advantage over our adversaries through
the Third Offset Strategy. The strategic UAS enterprise
can benefit immensely by changing the ways of C2, to
synchronize efforts across the globe in the present, and
be postured for future technological innovation.
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CHAPTER 7
INTEGRATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI)
INTO MILITARY OPERATIONS:
A BOYD CYCLE FRAMEWORK
James W. Mancillas
Researcher
The U.S. military has been a leader in implementing emerging and revolutionary technologies. The
ever-growing use of autonomous vehicles is an obvious example. These systems have given U.S. forces
unprecedented situational awareness and operational
abilities. However, there are indicators that the adoption of these maturing information age technologies
have yet to reach their full potential. Currently, the
use of autonomous systems paradoxically relies extensively on human capital to maintain the systems and
process the data generated by those systems.
As the information age matures, the ability to process and distil information may be its new defining
feature. The ability to fully integrate information collection, communication, storage, and processing into
timely and decisive action may result in new technologically and conceptual advantages. These technologies, embodied in artificial intelligence (AI) and the
development of autonomous systems, may cumulatively result in what may be called the Third Offset.
However, achieving a Third Offset is not a foregone
conclusion.
Exploiting the advantages of AI and autonomous
systems will require fuller integration into the decision process (the loop) and an increased trust in their
ability to act without human intervention. To examine
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their integration into decision loops, the relative simplicity of the Boyd loop, also known as the observe,
orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop, is an ideal tool to
explore AI systems. Its intuitive four steps are easily
understood and closely align to the first four principle elements of AI—perceive, understand, predict, and
manipulate (as well as learn).1 The OODA loop provides a clear and obvious framework to explore the
implications of integrating AI systems across the spectrum of competitive military environments.
ANALYSIS
Increasingly, success in the battlespace has become
about collecting information, evaluating that information, and then making quick, decisive decisions.
Network centric warfare with its advanced command
and control (C2) concepts demonstrated this concept
during the emerging phases of information age warfare. Winning in the decision space is winning in the
battle space.2 Yet, the defining feature of information
age warfare, the ability to gather, store, and communicate data, has begun to exceed human processing capabilities.3 Thus maintaining a competitive advantage in
the information age will require a new way of integrating an ever-increasing volume of data into a decision
cycle.
Future AI systems offer the potential to continue
maximizing the advantages of information superiority, while overcoming limits in human cognitive abilities. AI systems, with their near endless and faultless
memory, lack of emotional investment, and potentially
unbiased analyses, may continue to complement future
military leaders with competitive cognitive advantages. However, these advantages may only emerge if
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AI systems are understood, properly utilized, and integrated seamlessly into a decision process.
The potential implications of future AI systems will
be explored through the remainder of this discussion
using the OODA loop as the overarching framework.
This framework will provide a methodical approach
to explore: 1) how future autonomous AI systems may
participate in the various elements of decision cycles;
2) what aspects of military operations may need to
change to accommodate future AI systems; and, 3)
how implementation of AI and its varying degrees of
autonomy may create a competitive decision space.4
The examination of potential implications of AI on
internal military operations will also use the doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership, education,
personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) framework.
OBSERVE
This analysis begins with the first element of the
OODA loop, observe. Observation is more than simply
seeing. Observation implies two distinct but entwined
activities. The first activity is scanning the environment
and the second is recognizing potentially meaningful
events. It is the combination of these activities that
forms the basis for a sentient observation. The automation of observation can be performed using AI systems, either solely as an automated observation, or as
part of a broader integrated decision loop. The degree
of autonomy for the two activities of observation may
vary. High autonomous AI systems may be allowed to
select or alter scan patterns, boundary conditions, and
numerous other parameters; potentially including the
selection of the scanning platforms and sensor packages. While at the other end of the autonomy spectrum,
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low autonomous AI systems might be precluded from
altering pattern recognition parameters or thresholds
for flagging an event as potentially significant. In this
domain, AI systems could perform potentially complex
analyses, but with limited ability to assess or reassess
the potential significance of an event. Fundamentally,
the output from the observe activity is the observation
of data and the signaling that further analysis is necessary. A military example of this would be the development of field reports that annotate the observation
of hostile adversaries. The report developed by a field
unit is reflexively developed and passed up a chain of
command. Moreover, organizationally, no significant
analysis is performed until some command or staff element decides to take further action.
Extrapolating from this, it is not difficult to infer
that when AI systems operate as autonomous observation systems they could easily be integrated into
existing doctrine, organizations, and training. Issues
may however arise when we consider manned and
unmanned mixed teams. For example, sentry outpost
locations and configurations described in existing doctrine may need to be revised to address additional considerations for AI systems, such as safety, degrees of
autonomy, communication, and physical capabilities,
and dimensions, and integration issues with human
forces.
ORIENT
Orient is the processes and analyses that establish
the relative significance of an observation. The orientation occurs when the observation is placed in the context of previous experiences, organizational, cultural,
or historic frameworks; and other observations. From
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this, the observation’s significance and priority are
assessed.
The degree of priority given to an observation then
determines how resources will be committed to incorporate the observation into an operational picture. If
the priority is low, further analysis may not occur. If
the priority is moderate, perhaps the observation is
aggregated with other observations for later analyses, or rudimentary analysis. Moreover, if the priority
is high, the observation may be evaluated in detail.
Thus, in a data rich environment, with limited analytical resources, large fractions of observations may not
be evaluated in detail or brought into the operational
picture.
The emergence of AI systems capable of contextualizing data has the potential to address this issue. The
International Business Machine (IBM) Corporation has
already fielded advanced cognitive systems capable
of performing near human level complex analyses.5
Moreover, it is expected this trend will continue and
these types of AI systems will continue to displace
humans performing many staff officer, “white collar,”
activities.6 Autonomy issues associated with AI systems orientating data and developing operational pictures are complex. AI systems operating with a high
autonomy may independently prioritize data; add
or remove data from an operational picture; possibly
deconflict contradictory data streams; change informational lenses; and set priorities and hierarchies. High
autonomous AI systems could also ensure the operational picture is the best reflection of the current information. The tradeoff to this most accurate operational
picture might however be a rapidly evolving operational picture with little continuity that could possibly
confound and confuse system users.
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At the other end of the spectrum, low autonomous
AI systems might not explore alternative interpretations of data. These systems may use only prescribed
informational lenses and data priorities established by
system users or developers. The tradeoff for a stable
and consistent operational picture might be one that
is biased by the applied informational lenses and data
applications. This type of AI system may just show
users what they want and expect to see.
The use of AI systems for the consolidation, prioritization, and framing of data may require a review
of how military doctrine and policy guides the use of
information. Similar to the development of rules of
engagement, doctrine and policy present interesting
challenges to developing rules of information framing.
For example, doctrine or policy development could
potentially prescribe or restrict the use of informational
lenses. While applying a lens to organize information
is not without precedent, under a paradigm where AI
systems could implement doctrine and policy without question or moderation, the consequences of a
policy change might create a host of unanticipated
consequences.
DECIDE
Decide is the process used to develop, and then
select a course of action. As a rational action, a decision is the selection of a course of action that is forecasted to improve a situation or achieve a specified
goal. Prior to selecting a course of action, the military
decision-making process generally requires the development of multiple courses of action (COA) and consideration of their likely outcomes. These COAs are
compared (based on criteria), and the COA with the
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preferred outcome is selected. The methods for developing COAs and choosing among them can be categorized as rules based, or values based, decisions.
Rules based decisions explore ends, ways, and
means, through the lenses of feasibility and suitability,
but do not actively address questions of acceptability
or risk. Further, rules based decisions are prescriptive with the decision space closed. A good example
of rules based decision-making is a cashier dispensing
correct change. There are multiple COAs or solutions
to the problem; provide change in using largest bills
and coins available and appropriate, or use the smallest bill and coins available and appropriate. These
COAs are bounded and well quantified. Yet because
the rules for providing change were absolute, there
were no considerations of acceptability or risk in COA
development or selection.
In this example of providing correct change, legal
and ethical values are intrinsic to the process of providing correct change. However, when applied as a
rule, provide correct change contains no consideration
(by a cashier) about the acceptability or risks of not
providing correct change. The only consideration is
compliance with the rule.
In this sense, if an AI system is using a rules based
decision process, there is inherently a human-in-theloop, regardless of the level of the AI autonomy. This
is because human value judgments are inherently contained within the rule development process. From this
perspective, when considering the concept of human
in or on-the-loop, it would be worthwhile to include
additional qualifiers of active or embedded human
participation. Active human-in-the-loop implies an
operator or external agent is assuming some responsibility for the value judgments. However, an AI system
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with an embedded human-in-the-loop implies an engineered value judgment, thus anchoring responsibilities for the value judgments to the engineers of the AI
system.
Value based decisions explore ends, ways, and
means, through the lenses of feasibility and suitability, while also potentially addressing issues of acceptability and risk. Value based decisions are generally
associated with subjective value assessments, greater
dimensionality, and generally contain some legal,
moral, or ethical qualities. The generation of COAs and
their selection may involve substantially more nuanced
judgments. Autonomy for AI systems involved in the
decision process can be divided into the two parts of
the decide step, the development of COAs (and their
predicted outcomes) and the selection of a preferred
COA. The division of decide into two distinct activities may result in a mix in levels of autonomy used in
the decision process. High levels of autonomy may be
granted for the development of COAs, while medium
or low autonomy may be granted for the selection of
a preferred COA. Alternatively, other combinations of
high or low autonomy could be used.
The employment of value based or rules based
decisions tends to vary according to the operational
environmental and the level of operation. Tactical
applications often tend toward rules based decisions,
while operational and strategic applications tend
toward values based decisions. Clarifying doctrine,
training, and policies on rules based and values based
decisions could be an essential element of ensuring
that autonomous decision-making AI systems are
effectively understood, trusted, and utilized.
During the acquisition of AI systems, AI decision
process categories (such as rules-based, values-based,
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emulation-based, or other processes) should be understood and standardized. Thus, creating clear categories
of AI systems may improve the system acceptance and
the expectations by human operators and engineers.
This could also aid in clarifying responsibilities for AI
decisions between operators, systems, and engineers.
ACT
The last element of the OODA loop is act. For AI
systems, this ability to manipulate the environment
may take several forms. The first form may be indirect,
where an AI system concludes its manipulation step
by notifying an operator of its recommendations. The
second form may be through direct manipulation, in
either or both the cyber and physical domains. Within
the OODA framework, once the decision has been
made, the act is reflexive. For advanced AI systems,
there is the potential for feedback to be provided and
integrated as an action is taken. If the systems supporting the decision operate as expected, and events unfold
as predicted, the importance of the degree of autonomy for the AI system (to act) may be trivial. However,
if events unfold unexpectedly, the autonomy of an AI
system to respond could be of great significance.
Consider a scenario where an observation point
(OP) is being established. The decision to set up the OP
was supported by many details. Among these concerns
were the path taken to set up the OP, the optimal location of the OP, the expected weather conditions, and
the exact time the OP would be operational. Under a
strict interpretation, if any of the real world details differed, even slightly, from those supporting the original
decision, they would all be viewed as adjustments to
the decision, and the decision would be voided. While
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under a less restrictive interpretation, if the details
closely matched the expected conditions, they would
be viewed as adjustments to the approved decision,
and the decision would still be valid.
High autonomous AI systems could be allowed to
make adjustments to the act. Allowing adjustments to
the act would preclude a complete OODA cycle reiteration. By avoiding a reiteration of the OODA cycle, an
AI system might outperform low autonomous AI elements (and human oversight) and provide an advantage to the high autonomous system. Low autonomous
AI systems following strict interpretation would be
required to reinitiate a new decision cycle every time
the real world did not exactly match expected conditions. While the extreme case may cause a perpetual
initiation of OODA cycles, some adjustments could
be made to the AI system to mitigate some of these
concerns. The challenge still remains to determine the
level of change that is significant enough to restart
the OODA loop. Ultimately, designers of the system
would need to consider how to resolve this issue.
Humans often employ assumptions when assigning or performing an action. There is a natural assumption that real world conditions will differ from those
used in the planning and authorization process. When
those differences appear large, a decision is reevaluated. However, when the differences appear small, a
new decision is not sought, and some risk is accepted.
The amount of risk is often intuitively assessed, and
dependent upon personal preferences, the action will
continue or it is stopped. However, because of the more
literal nature of computational systems, autonomous
systems may not have the ability to assess and accept
personal risks. As a result military doctrine addressing command and leadership philosophies, such as
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mission command and decentralize operations, should
be reviewed, and if necessary updated, to determine
their applicability to operations in the information
age.7
CONCLUSION
This section examined how AI systems might perform four principle functions: perceive, understand,
predict (and choose), and manipulate (act). These functions were then examined in respect to OODA decision
loop. The OODA loop, with its four principle steps:
observe, orient, decide, and act, closely aligned with
the aforementioned four elements of AI systems and
provided an approach to consider future AI systems
for military operations.
Through this lens, it was demonstrated that the integration of future AI systems has the potential to permeate the entirety of military operations, from acquisition
philosophies to human-AI team collaborations. Key
issues identified in this study include a potential need
to develop clear categories of AI systems and applications. These categories should be aligned along axes of
trust, with rules-based and values-based decision processes clearly demarcated. This study also established
a coherent framework for future discussions about the
integration of AI systems in future military operations.
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PART III:
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CHAPTER 8
INFLUENCING THE RATE OF INNOVATION
Phillip Smallwood
Researcher
We are entering an era where American dominance in
key warfighting domains is eroding, and we must find
new and creative ways to sustain, and in some areas
expand, our advantage even as we deal with more limited
resources. This will require a focus on new capabilities
and becoming more efficient in their development and
fielding.1

STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT
Erosion of U.S. military superiority will continue
if the Department of Defense (DoD) does not think
critically and creatively about the modernization challenges faced today and the operational challenges to
be confronted in the future. This requires our strategic leaders to focus on limiting the DoD constraints to
innovation and providing a vision of the future force
and a path for developing the optimal future force.
In order for the U.S. Army to become an innovative organization, it will be necessary to organize
appropriately. Army organizations must promote
an innovative culture, accept risk, and leverage new
ideas while collaborating and partnering on experiments to enhance creativity. Collaboration is essential
to successful innovation and includes partnerships
between acquisition, requirements, the defense industry, research and development community, Soldiers
and units. The future Army depends on the ability to
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think clearly about the future character of warfare and
apply processes that will foster creative thought about
achieving strategic overmatch through an agile acquisition framework. The acquisition framework adopts
commercial business concepts for innovation while tailoring to support the bureaucracy of the DoD business
process.
THE INNOVATIVE FRAMEWORK
The 23 Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC) are
the enduring first-order problems the Army must solve
to improve the combat effectiveness of the current and
future force. The fourth AWFC is to, “Adapt the Institutional Army and Innovate.”2 In order to accomplish
this, the Army should develop an innovative framework that evolves the Army to not only be innovative,
but also accelerate innovation and improve combat
effectiveness for the current and future force. The innovative framework can use existing ideas and processes
in the DoD and refine, tailor, and improve them for a
specific project outcome and (as applicable) integrate
them with industry best practices. The framework
supports continuous and regular collaboration with
industry to assist in various strategic approaches to
force modernization. These strategic approaches range
from technology maturity, feasibility studies, and to
assistance in requirements development or mentorship programs of small innovative business.
The innovative framework accomplishes the following. First, the framework incorporates innovative
organizations with innovative cultures. Second, it
emphasizes partnering and collaboration with industry and the operational force. Third, it leverages opportunities to experiment, learn, and develop ideas in a
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collaborative environment for both industry and military. Fourth, it facilitates an innovative process that
links operators and engineers in the field that enables
innovation and optimizes information exchange while
fostering creativity. At the lowest level, the framework
aligns developers with the users resulting in enhanced
learning and accelerating the rate of innovation.
COMMERCIAL BEST PRACTICES
A review of the flourishing innovation in the corporate world is a DoD necessity. The DoD must adopt
best practices that are applicable to the DoD business model of operation. Six best commercial practices emerge from various commercial sources that
should be incorporated in the acquisition innovative
framework.
• First, align to a vision, strategy, and culture.3
Strategic leaders should create the vision and
establish the priorities for future force modernization. The culture of the organization needs to
believe in the vision and strategy and to understand their role in contributing to its success.
• Second, “divergence” functions of creative
thinking and organizations. The collaborative design process can assist with breaking
down typical thought processes and solutions
to problems. Outside resources can bring new
ideas, different perspectives, and spur creative
thinking. For example, design the multi-domain
battle concept into the development process
upfront and early.
• Third, processes for innovation management.4
Innovation management is evolving into a
mainstream management discipline much like
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•

•
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behavior management of the 1990s. Successful
innovative companies have presented a predictable, repeatable innovation process.
Fourth, “evolve ideas” as an innovative framework tenet applicable to best practices.5 This
best practice focuses on evolving ideas based
on a collaborative effort among a diverse group,
maturing concepts to further explore their validity. Conducting prototype experiments to test
and validate ideas or concepts is the foundation
to either build upon or dismiss the idea. The
value of early experimentation is the efficient
use of time and schedule; early failure saves
resources for more rewarding ideas.
Fifth, evaluate and rate concepts or ideas, which
are essentially grading the product based on
its merit.6 The Army Warfighting Assessment
(AWA) is an opportunity for capabilities to be
evaluated and rated by Soldiers; this data and
information is shared as necessary for evolutionary improvement. This is an essential step
in the process that must be performed by subject
matter experts who understand the product and
how it will be deployed.
Sixth, continuously scan the future environment.
Innovative organizations continuously evaluate
the evolving changing environment. Developing concepts and capabilities today for future
risk is essential in developing for the future.

ARMY CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION CENTER
(ARCIC) INNOVATION DIRECTORATE (ID)
The ARCIC ID is a proposed acquisition-centric
directorate within ARCIC. The ID is the organizational
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foundation of the innovative framework. The ID will
emphasize the innovative culture and lead the Army
in its pursuit to innovative ways to sustain Army and
Joint strategic capabilities for the 21st century. ID
aligns with the other three directorates in ARCIC, but
perform duties that align force modernization with
the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, defense
industry, the acquisition community, science and technology, and service components. This directorate will
promote the innovative culture in order to unharness
the energy and creativity of industry and soldiers.
Leveraging the associational thinking of innovative
industry and soldiers is an area of opportunity that can
assist in improving capabilities. Soldiers have a vested
interest in what equipment they use in combat, increasing their stake and value in contributing to the product
and its development. Ideally, we want our operators
to be part of the process engaging in creative behavioral skills to improve their ability to fight and win.
The ID would be an acquisition organization within
ARCIC that provides the appropriate diversity of skill
sets that understand the institutional Army, governmental bureaucracy, and aligns with the requirements
community to facilitate efficient material development
in support of operational requirements, timelines, and
the Third Offset priorities.
General Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Army, stated, “Aligning responsibilities with authorities only improves the acquisition process.”7 The ID
recommendation includes leadership of an acquisition
brigadier general with acquisition officers and civilian
supervisors as team leads throughout the organization. The 0-7 grade aligns with the other directorates
in ARCIC and is necessary to influence modernization decisions across the strategic level of stakeholders
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involved in force modernization, requirements, and
program executive offices. Success hinges on maximum traction to change, overcome institutional barriers, and rapidly integrate necessary stakeholders.
The ID would be ineffective as an innovative organization if it did not have the resources to support its
mission. Resources include the acquisition personnel
and funding to implement focus assessments, experiments, and evaluations based on Army priorities. The
implied task with resources includes the management
of a budget and submission of a Program Objective
Memorandum across the Fiscal Year Defense Program.
The bill payer for the ID positions requires further
analysis from the Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), Army Contracting Command, and the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
THE INNOVATIVE CONCEPT
The primary responsibility for the ID would be to
provide the integration between requirements, acquisition, and the face to industry. Therefore, all material
development requirements will be assisted by the ID.
This responsibility includes supporting the ARCIC
learning demands relevant to material capability solutions and working closely with TRADOC directorates, Brigade Modernization Command, Force 2025
maneuvers, Army Warfare Group, Rapid Equipping
Force, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
and the science and technology community. The ID
would apply the learning demands to lines of effort
and the priorities established by the U.S. Army and the
Third Offset. This concept keeps the acquisition community engaged in their area of expertise (material
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development) while further integrating requirements
development and the acquisition process. Accuracy
of the required capability is fundamentally the most
important part of the acquisition process. One of
the primary objectives of the innovative concept is
to improve on the integration of the acquisition and
requirements processes.
In addition, the concept supports an ARCIC single
face to industry to assist with the partnering and collaboration with DoD industry partners. Leveraging
input from industry is crucial to the creative innovative process and necessary to the discovery and generation of new and valuable capabilities. This can be
accomplished by adopting the U.S. Special Operations
Command’s Technology Integration Liaison Office
concept into ARCIC via the ID. The ID would lead the
“face to industry” for the Army, and coordinate and
manage industry briefs and updates for innovative
projects and ideas from industry. The management
of industry is important to the innovative concept; it
is critical that acquisition professionals include acquisition lawyers to lead this effort. The safeguarding of
proprietary technology, intellectual property, information, and data—to include cost data—are paramount
in this effort.
INNOVATE FORCE 2025 MANEUVERS (F2025M)
Thomas Edison developed the concept of the
industrial research and development laboratory when
he built what was really an idea factory at Menlo Park,
New Jersey. Menlo Park had no manufacturing facilities—only research and prototype construction was
performed there.8
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F2025M are exercises and experiments designed to
incorporate, assess, test, evaluate, and validate Force
2025 and Beyond ideas and capabilities.9 The F2025M
can comprise of almost any venue that can evaluate,
assess or provide feedback to the developer, company, engineering team, soldiers, program manager or
requirements writer to either improve, inform or terminate a product or concept.
The F2025M concept is the experimentation opportunity for any organization to collect information or
data on a developing capability or concept. The ID
will facilitate its own experiments—called focused
assessments—based on developing capabilities prioritized by Centers of Excellence (CoE) and ARCIC. In
addition, the AWA will continue to be one of the premier F2025M venues to experiment, evaluate, and collect information for new up-and-coming capabilities.
Properly funding and empowering the CoE battle labs
to lead the experimentation effort based on CoE concepts and priorities is a first order task. Solving problems and refining requirements upfront and early at
the proponent level is essential. The ID would champion and advocate experimentation results and concepts to ARCIC and all associate stakeholders. The ID
as described would influence the acceleration of Army
priorities aligned with the Third Offset.
CONCLUSION
General Milley stated, “Our adversaries are rapidly leveraging available technology; our acquisition
process must be agile enough to keep pace.”10 Based
on this caution, the Army should consider the following recommendations. First, implement the proposed
organization and staffing of the ID within the ranks
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of the ARCIC team. Integrate the proposed acquisition framework and maximize its traction across the
Army, TRADOC, and the Acquisition community. The
proposed acquisition framework aligns with the Chief
of Staff of the Army and ARCIC priorities linked to
Force 2025 and the ARCIC mission. Analyze—examine solutions to AWFC, specifically answering the
fourth AWFC, “Adapt the Institutional Army and
Innovate.”11 In addition, the Army should examine
learning, demand answers, and apply that knowledge
to material development priorities associated with
the Army’s Big 6 +1 funding priorities and the Third
Offset priorities. Implement solutions to increase the
rate of innovation, collaborate with industry, requirement community, program executive offices, and
the entire force modernization team on experiments,
focused assessments, F2025M on concepts, ideas and
capabilities that have learning demands and require
analysis and assessments for future force opportunities.12 The Army should leverage best practices from
successful innovative commercial companies and new
DoD innovative initiatives like the Defense Innovation
Unit Experimental approach and Better Buying Power
3.0. These efforts coupled with the proposed acquisition framework will accelerate the rate of innovation
within the Army.
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CHAPTER 9
IMPLICATIONS TO ARMY ACQUISITION
Troy Denomy
Researcher
The Army acquisition process is designed to reduce
risk to the Army enterprise to the maximum extent
possible. As a result, the process is complex and convoluted, which results in long development, production
and fielding cycles. In order to realize the potential of
the Third Offset, the Army must identify areas within
the acquisition process to make more efficient or significantly modify. Failure to adapt to the emerging
environment will widen current capability gaps and
create new gaps between the Army and its potential
adversaries.
The velocity at which technology emerges creates
two critical implications for the Army—the need to
emphasize program schedule over cost and to reform
its requirements process. Additionally, the rise of peer
competitors creates a budgetary balancing act—supporting readiness and maintaining current capability
while also addressing the requirement to invest in the
future force. However, no implication is greater than
the cultural changes required to implement Third
Offset capabilities.
The Army’s challenge will only worsen as the speed
at which technology becomes available or adoptable
continues to increase.1 The Army can no longer fail to
be an early adopter of new and disruptive technologies.
Simply, the first actor or nation to adopt the emerging
technology will gain a competitive advantage over its
rivals. For example, should a near peer develop and
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procure fully autonomous weapons prior to the United
States that near peer would gain a temporal advantage
relative to U.S. capabilities.
The importance of rapidly providing technology
to the Army, or what industry describes as “time to
market,” was highlighted by two leading industry
thinkers, John Kovach and Artie Mabbet, who posit:
looking at adversary cycle times we see that their agility
and focus allows them to be inside of our production loop,
often fielding counters to our capabilities as our systems
are introduced . . . creating gaps and forcing reactionary
responses.2

However, Kovach and Mabbet offer that, “If that
equation can be flipped, where . . . [we] can introduce
advanced capabilities at a faster pace, it will put our
adversaries in a more reactionary mode.”3
Requirements are the most significant activity for
program to meet its cost and schedule target. A 2008
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found
that “programs with requirement changes experienced
cost increases of 72%, while costs grew by 11% among
those programs that did not change requirements.”4
Further, a 2011 GAO report stated that “programs with
changes to performance requirements experienced
roughly four times more growth in research and development costs and three to five times greater schedule
delays.”5
There are fundamental areas that the Army needs
to consider vis-à-vis requirements, as it pertains to
the Third Offset to avoid previous painful acquisition
misses. The Army must articulate a concept for the
conflicts of 2035-2050 that is informed by the potential
Third Offset capabilities. The Army must then proceed
on a much broader series of experiments and battle lab
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effort to allow the Army to introduce a specific campaign plan for a tiered set of priority requirements
based on gaps identified during the wargames and
experiments.
The Army must also open an honest and candid
feedback loop with industry. Raytheon’s chief executive officer, Thomas Kennedy, offered that critical to
the success of the Third Offset “will be close collaboration among industry, academia and government to
rapidly innovate and integrate the next-generation.”6
Furthermore, analysis of recent Israeli acquisitions
provides another insightful notion that partnership
with industry, not competition, “enables shorter timelines by matching current needs” and increases system
effectiveness.7 For example, the Army should identify
core research and development capabilities to maintain within its research laboratories that would provide industry an understanding of other areas for it
to invest. This practice would eliminate duplicity of
effort and resources by ensuring the Army and industry are not solving the same technical problem. Likewise, rapid prototyping provides early assessments of
capabilities and reduces resource risk and opportunity
costs.
Finally, the Army should review how requirements
are crafted. Early adoption necessitates an incremental
process that allows the technology or capability to be
integrated over time as it continues to mature. A similar notion was recently provided by Dr. Will Roper,
in what he sees as the perils of how requirements are
defined. He suggested that there is far too much specificity in requirements that prohibit architecture or systems engineering trades.8 All of the aforementioned
requirement recommendations affect both resourcing
and culture.
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Similar to the challenge of rapidly adopting technology, the Army is also confronted by the lack of
fiscal resources. The Third Offset will intensify internal
pressures on the Army’s Research, Development, and
Acquisition account because of the funding required
to mature the technologies. Further, once the technologies are matured, a dichotomy will emerge between
funding the current, fielded systems versus the emerging, next generation systems, all while maintaining
readiness. Lieutenant General (Retired) David Barno
and Nora Bensahel described this as a “strategic crossroad” because:
the Army has to contend with a ‘pernicious combination
of a shrinking force, declining resources, increasing
global commitments, and the renewed possibility of
major power conflict.’9

Furthermore, Barno and Bensahel posit, “Leaders face
‘inevitable tradeoffs between the need to fight today’s
wars while preparing for the possible wars of the
future—and the need to pay for both.’”10
Additionally, parochial, interservice power struggles that occur every budget cycle will be exacerbated.
Not only is interservice budget competition likely, but
so are non-intraservice budget competitions as different proponents continue to argue to maintain established Programs of Record funding levels. Because the
funding process is a zero sum game, in order to fund
emerging Third Offset programs, the Services and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense will stay within
the Army’s Research, Development, and Acquisition
account for bill payers.11
This overarching budget challenge calls for “imagination, creative solutions, and unrestrained thinking.”12 Some possible options to consider are tiered
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forces, not only in readiness levels that are currently
under consideration, but also tiered capability. This
proposal, while creating the budget room, creates contentious issues. This will cause sustainment impacts to
maintain essentially two or more armies. In addition,
this could create training issues caused by personnel
turnover from one tier to the next. Lastly, this construct could create a counterproductive environment
of haves and have nots.
Arguably, the most efficient and best practice to
adopt is a regimented enterprise and a project-portfolio management framework. This framework would
advocate and encourage cross portfolio trades and
establish analytical underpinnings to resource allocation decisions causing resource managers to think of
the enterprise during Program Objective Memorandum development.
The Army must evaluate the use of Third Offset
capabilities within the acquisition process. For example, leveraging big data—deep learning and artificial intelligence (AI)—to assist in resource allocation,
program schedule optimization, and even within the
context of identification of programs with the highest
probability of success.
The previous challenges notwithstanding, the most
important endeavor the Army must address is its
acquisition culture.
The process in place currently emphasizes low-risk
solutions and approaches; however, technically and
programmatically there are times where significant gains
can be made by taking calculated risk.13

This overemphasis on reducing risk exposure results in
a culture that “rewards individuals and programs for
‘not messing up’ rather than incentivizing success.”14
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Therefore, the Army must thoroughly review how
it views risk. The Army is firmly grounded in risk
aversion, which stymies innovation. Reducing nearly
all programmatic risk requires time and funding and
there are measurable opportunity cost associated with
extreme risk aversion.15 This approach is seen in the
acquisition process where there is a “traditional hierarchy . . . [that] has numerous levels of leadership
involved in decision-making based on the type and
impact of the decision.”16 In order to both streamline
the process and to take full advantage of opportunities “Senior leadership needs to be able to rely on their
teams to take calculated risks” and “Key decisions
need to occur on the timeline of the technology and
progress of a program rather than based on the process” all of which implies a degree of empowerment.17
The need to innovate and adopt (field) quickly,
makes teaming a critical component for the Army’s
future acquisition success. To fully achieve unity of
effort, the Army should realign the Development and
Engineering Centers out of Army Materiel Command
(AMC) to the Office of the U.S. Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. Since AMC’s core capability is sustainment, this
is a sensible realignment with the potential to create
greater effectiveness and efficiency.
In conclusion, the emergence of the Third Offset
provides the Army an opportunity to optimize acquisition initiatives and efforts. This provides a compelling
narrative to drive the necessary changes to become
more efficient and effective. The one characteristic that
remains constant during the next 20 to 30 years is the
velocity of change and speed of innovation. The Army
must recognize this, adapt to it, and take advantage of
this trend, or risk being left behind.
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CHAPTER 10
HUMAN-MACHINE DECISION-MAKING
AND TRUST
Eric Van Den Bosch
Researcher
We have to place the big bets . . ., every assumption we
hold . . . must be challenged. War, war tends to slaughter
the sacred cows of tradition. . . . Those of us . . . that
stubbornly cling to the past will lose . . . in a big way.1

For 2050 and beyond, the Department of Defense
(DoD) Third Offset Strategy leverages technology
across warfighting capabilities with new operational
and organization constructs to enable DoD to wage
multi-domain battle.2 Human-machine collaborative
decision-making is a future capability that teams the
best characteristics of human leaders with opportunities derived from artificial intelligence (AI) including
autonomous systems and machine learning. The U.S.
Army is people-centric, vice weapons platform-centric, so the Army needs to be aggressive in developing
leaders to maximize human-machine decision-making effectiveness in a multi-domain operational
environment.3
The current Army Leadership Requirements Model
addresses attributes and competencies of leaders that
centers on human-human relationships, but the future
trends will challenge leaders with more human-machine relationships.4 The Army should adapt leader
and team development strategies, underpinned by
mission command philosophy (centered on trust),
leadership attributes (character, presence, intellect),

109

and core leadership competencies (leads, develops,
achieves), to enable our leaders to aptly trust and lead
increasingly capable levels within a broad category of
AI. This aligns with (but is currently absent from) several Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC): 1) Situational Understanding; 9) Improve Soldier, Leader and
Team Performance; 10) Develop Agile and Adaptive
Leaders; and, 19) Exercise Mission Command.5
The Third Offset implications to Army leadership
development will be formed in three areas: 1) expected
maturity of AI capabilities; 2) interpersonal and autonomous systems trust; and, 3) implications on leader
influence.
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS CAPABILITY
“Artificial intelligence (AI) is the capability of computer systems to perform tasks that normally require
human intelligence such as . . . decision-making.”6
Within AI, automation is:
The level of human intervention required by a system
to execute a given task(s) in a given environment. The
highest level of automation (full) is no immediate human
intervention.7

Autonomy, different from automation, is the “level
of independence that humans grant a system. . . . to
achieve an assigned mission . . . [with] planning, and
decision-making.”8 Looking at human-machine decision-making, experts from industry and the DoD foresee AI capability maturity in 2050 at a level where
machines have functional autonomy (machine learning and improving within a specific role), otherwise
known as narrow AI. This does not reduce the prominence of the human element.
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The Army expects to be challenged by a global military peer power where all domains (land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace) are contested. The speed
of recognition, speed of decision, and speed of action
will strain human abilities, so more human tasks will
be aided by autonomous systems.9 The Army’s Chief
Information Officer/G6, in the Army Network Strategy, envisions that:
augmented humans, autonomous processes and
automated decision making, will permeate the battlefield.
The speed at which data are dispersed will create an
information-rich environment . . . [where] extraction of
mission-relevant content may be challenging.10

The Army’s robotic and autonomous systems (RAS)
strategy also emphasizes that machines will improve
decision-making, but might also overwhelm human
decision management ability.11 A human-machine
team, collaborating in the operations process, can be
exceedingly responsive to changes in the fast-paced,
complex, and adaptive future operating environment
while maintaining the human dimension. As with any
relationship, a level of trust is required to be dependent on another teammate and still be effective.
TRUST
Trust is “assured reliance on the character, ability,
strength, or truth of someone or something.”12 Prudent
trust is a competitive advantage that increases efficiency and effectiveness of teams and organizations.
There are many components of trust that are relevant
to man-machine interaction—trust between individual
humans as trustee and trustor, between humans and
computer automation, and between cultures in order
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to analyze the implications of trust on human-machine
collaborative decision-making.
Trust between two entities, the trustee and the trustor, is a dynamic at the personal level. Trustee variables include integrity, intent, abilities, and results.
The absolute value of these variables is not important,
but rather how the trustor perceives the value of these
variables in the trustee. A trustor’s propensity to trust
is based on their biases, beliefs, and experiences—and
is the lens through which they view trustworthiness.13
Trust studies by Stephen H. R. Covey compare high
trust and low trust factors in relationships. High trust
builds confidence, resulting in faster decisions and
lower resultant costs, whereas low trust causes suspicion and negative effects.14 A “no trust” leader loses
opportunities and opens windows for adversaries to
exploit friendly vulnerabilities due to indecision. An
“absolute trust” leader appears to be effective, but
simply relinquishes their leader role by excessive
trust. A “prudent trust” leader sensibly balances trust
relationships to leverage dividends from trust. The
propensity to trust generates synergy without relinquishing leadership.
Research on human interaction with automation
and robots provides similar results in the human-machine trustor-trustee relationship. People trust automation to a level commensurate with their confidence
in the machine—and its ability to complete the task at
least as well as they could on their own. This is tempered
by how well they feel they can control the machine
system.15 In general, the trustor gives trust when they
perceive it will result in a beneficial outcome.16
Another meaningful study involved analyzing
automation trust across cultures.17 The study grouped
cultures into dignity, face, and honor culture groups.
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Dignity cultures emphasize individual self-worth
and are more prevalent in Western Europe and North
America where laws are important aspects that govern
interpersonal transactions. Face cultures, primarily in
East Asia, centered on stable social hierarchies and
norms that cherish other’s views of them with high
trust for in-group and lower trust for out-groups.
Honor cultures, primarily in Middle East and Latin
America, have more unstable social hierarchies that
require significantly longer experience to develop
trust.18 The research suggests that interpersonal trust
within these cultures translates into trust in automation
also. Dignity cultures have the highest relative trust
of automation and AI while honor cultures have the
lowest relative trust of automation, with face cultures
in between. Operators in honor cultures required more
extensive training with the automation than operators
from dignity and face cultures to develop an equal
degree of trust in automation.19 This suggests that, at
least culturally, the United States has an advantage
in adopting autonomous systems with human-machine relationships. The caveat is that individuals may
exhibit traits of other cultures based on their personal
beliefs, biases, and experiences.
A 2016 Defense Science Board study described
barriers to trust in autonomous systems that emphasized inputs, processing, and outputs. Human inputs,
especially sensory functions, are not easily replicated
for machines, but machines do have the potential for
a much higher number of more varied input types. In
decision-making, this input variance can create differences between how either the human or machine
understands the environment or defines the problem.
During processing, even if both humans and machines
receive exactly the same inputs, each may assign
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different degrees of relevance to each of those inputs,
resulting in differences in the underlying reasoning.
Moreover, even if those same inputs are weighed with
the same value, machine learning, with deeper and
more rapid cycles, may lead to different results than
a human—who might weigh a single significant life
experience very highly when he or she makes decisions.
A machine may lack other contextual learning that
humans gain from more broad experiences. The output
barriers may be ineffective human-machine computer
interfaces (keyboard, mouse, screen, etc.) that slow
communications in situations requiring speed. While
enhanced language processing and visual interfaces
may make the experience richer, it could still paralyze
the human with overwhelming amounts of complex
information. Human-machine trust barriers, including cognitive disparity or even resentment, have the
potential to be significant as machines learn and retain
information much faster, broader, (and better?) than
human teammates. There are not only great opportunities to leverage autonomous system capabilities, but
also challenges in fielding capabilities to leaders who
do not trust the full capability.
IMPLICATIONS ON LEADER INFLUENCE
The Army is a leader-centric organization in which
the leader must have trust and is responsible to establish trust with others. Army Leadership, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, specifically
emphasizes that leaders need “the courage to trust.”20
In order to realize the military potential of human-machine collaborative decision-making and teaming, it is
useful to acknowledge there will be a need for leaders to prudently place their trust in machines and
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AI. There is, however, considerable ground to cover.
Despite the inexorable proliferation of “smart” decision tools and semi-autonomous systems— and the
tacit understanding that AI (or at least some degree
of artificial learning) will play a bigger role in future
military operations—the current Army Leadership
Requirements Model does not address the shift to
more human-machine relationships. In order to prepare leaders for the future, the Army should update
this model to meet the challenges of the multi-domain
battle environment, enabled by human-machine teaming. While the leader attributes (character, presence,
intellect) and competencies (leads, develops, achieves)
may remain the same, they will likely need to transform as Third Offset AI and autonomous capabilities
become fielded systems.
Machines will increasingly develop as a cognitive
aid to humans, placing greater importance on leaders’
ability to leverage the information processing, storage
capability, and innovation capacity of the machine.
This will stress the sound judgment component of the
current leader attribute, intellect, since the machine
reasoning processes may not be obvious to the human
leader. With some Third Offset capabilities, the leader
will not be the best, smartest, or most expert in many
tasks and functions. Leaders must develop mindsets
that collaborative decision-making and performance
stems from both humans and machines gaining experience together. This will be a game changer. The
develops competency skill (from the Army Leadership
Requirements Model) will need to include developing
the human-machine team, vice exclusively a human
team.
Adjustments in the Army Leadership Requirements
Model, early in autonomous system development,
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could minimize barriers to effective human-machine
teaming. There are at least three areas of influencing autonomous systems that should be taken into
account for future leader development: 1) educating
leaders to define and communicate behavioral constraints for machines—such as an ethical framework
and shared mental models for operational approach to
decision-making; 2) identifying and correcting divergent machine behavior; and, 3) responding to the possibility that machines may (rightly) identify divergent
(or less than optimal) human behavior—even in the
leader. This will take a new approach within the leadership development strategy.
CONCLUSION
On the future multi-domain battlefield, humans
will likely face significant challenges in the cycle of
conflict recognition, decision, and action. Machines
are expected to have functional autonomy by 2050
to enable human-machine collaborative decisionmaking. Understanding trust relationships and the
associated impacts in the human-machine relationship
are key to unlocking the competitive advantage of the
human-machine team. Beyond the trust element, the
implications on how leaders influence the autonomous
system are grounded in the attributes and competencies of the Army Leadership Requirements Model—but
they need modernized. This is particularly highlighted
by the intellect attribute and the develops competency.
The Army has an opportunity to address the implications on Army leadership development in the environment of the Third Offset Strategy with these initial
thoughts: 1) replicate human-human visual, verbal,
and tactile dialogue capabilities in human-machine
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interface to reduce barriers to trust; 2) conduct RAS
essential element analysis within the AWFCs, especially AWFC numbers 1, 9, 10, and 19 to create common
understanding, team development, and autonomous
systems leaders; and, 3) establish a credentials standard for autonomous systems for initial validation
with recurring auditing of machine learning to identify
divergent behavior.
Highlighting agile and adaptive leaders and mission
command philosophy only superficially addresses the
rising information velocity requiring human-machine
collaboration. Deeply embedded attributes need a distinct, deliberate approach beginning with developing
a leader’s propensity to trust and methods to influence
autonomous systems. The Army has an opportunity to
increase its competitive advantage over adversaries by
maximizing the best of humans and machines.
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CHAPTER 11
LEADER DEVELOPMENT AND THE
THIRD OFFSET
William R. Funches, Jr.
Researcher
The technology explosion in the future will require
a multifaceted approach to management—particularly when discussing leadership in an environment
with ubiquitous autonomous systems and artificial
intelligence (AI). Indeed, leadership will be the key
competent at managing such a complex environment.
The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Mark A.
Milley envisions the Army destroying enemy sensors,
air defenses, and land-based anti-ship missiles to open
paths for the rest of the joint force. “Land-based forces
now are going to have to penetrate denied areas to
facilitate air and naval forces,” Milley said. “This is
exact opposite of what we have done for the last 70
years, where air and naval forces have enabled ground
forces.”1 The U.S. military’s technology and leadership is evolving and so should the leadership strategy. Landpower ultimately provides decision makers
the capability for human-to-human interaction, the
best and most precise tool to influence and compel on
land. However, the ever-changing environment hints
that the United States will have to use new elements
of strategy when it comes to facing new threats from
adversities. As we look to the future, it will require a
new 21st-century approach.
The Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC)
considers that in order to set the Army’s future with
robots, it must focus on three main areas, autonomy, AI,
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and command and control (C2). This means the robots
employed by the force need to get better at “functioning independently from the user and think for itself
through the right sensor technology while working on
the battlefield with a multitude of other systems.”2 It
is essential that the military develop the correct doctrine and training to connect man and machine, and
ultimately establish authorities and permissions for AI
and autonomous systems. The technology and capabilities that have evolved into robotic systems are increasingly becoming more intuitive, lethal, and advanced.
The concern with this trajectory is defining the moral
and ethical concerns when mixing man with robots.
Chess Grandmaster Garry Kasparov wrote about
human-computer chess collaboration, “Human strategic guidance combined with the tactical acuity of a
computer was overwhelming.”3 Tesla and SpaceX’s
chief executive officer, Elon Musk, believes that man
must merge with machines or become irrelevant in the
AI age. Musk stated:
computers can communicate at a trillion bits per second,
while humans, whose main communication method
is typing with their fingers via a mobile device, can do
about 10 bits per second.4

A 2004 survey of military officers on the future of
robots in warfare revealed:
the officers identified developing a strategy and doctrine
as the third least important aspect to figure out (only
ahead of solving inter-service rivalry and allaying allies’
concerns). Meanwhile, the capabilities of these robotic
systems continue to advance both in intelligence and
lethality.5

122

There are a number of studies that examine the
required attributes and characteristics of military and
corporate leaders. Discussions center on what personal qualities are required to be a successful military
leader in the 21st century. The current doctrine that
focuses on leadership, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, aims at the human-to-human
relationships. The current Army Leader Development
Strategy 2013 contains a model that basically consists
of three domains of development—operational (training), institutional (education), and self-developmental
(experience).6 The Army must begin the discussion on
how it will train AI-enabled systems to be smarter and
more capable. By its nature, AI learns and gets better
with experience—just as humans do. In order to best
develop and prepare our force—both human and
machine—the Army should begin curricular and pedagogical experimentation that teaches leader development across a range of human to machine interaction.
The military can gain valuable insight from the
recommendations of Accenture’s AI Institute for
High Performance. They recommend training intelligent machines in context because they typically arrive
with very general capabilities. From a defense strategic management perspective, there would need to
be a comprehensive training program that outlines a
framework for military commanders to train AI systems. In addition to guidance that will govern how
these systems are trained, the Army leaders selected to
perform the training would need to have specific attributes that align with The Army Leadership Requirements Model.7
According to Accenture’s AI Institute for High Performance, the willingness to trust AI-generated advice
hinges on a manager’s understanding at all levels.
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Involving managers in AI training fosters a sense of
ownership in the learning process and provides managers’ familiarity with such systems. The result could
be a shared belief that AI extends, not eliminates,
human potential and a greater willingness to embrace
the technology.8
CONCLUSION
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) responsibilities are to be prepared to address a broad range of
contingencies and unpredictable crises well into the
future. It is imperative that we link the Army leadership competencies and attributes between humans and
machines. Creating a connection between leadership
development and machine development will ensure
that the human element remains tied to capabilities
in the Third Offset Strategy. The military will have to
ensure that leadership is:
willing to experiment in an effort to identify AI uses that
make the most sense for their organization and teams.
A great way to implement efforts is to create structured
experiments with AI to help zero in on the most promising
opportunities, including the use of intelligent machines
to accelerate human learning.9

This may enable leaders to establish trust, character,
values, and warrior ethos between man and machine.
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CHAPTER 12
MORE THAN A GAME: THIRD OFFSET AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR MORAL INJURY
James Boggess
Researcher
Perhaps the most useful technology coming out
of artificial intelligence (AI) research is computerized
decision support systems (DSS). DSS advances the use
of computers from simply managing data, to using
data to provide courses of action (COA). Some soldiers
liken the use of DSS to playing a computer or video
game.1 The adversary is an icon, and COA are graphics. Research indicates that gamers use a different set
of ethical rules in a game than they would use in the
real world.2 Since the DSS environment emulates a
game, soldiers may end up using game ethics in place
of their personal ethics, delaying moral reflection, and
potentially leading to moral injury.
GAME WORLD ETHICS
For many gamers, the characters in the game do
not represent reality; instead, they are seen as simply
obstacles to overcome in order to reach an objective.3
Research shows that gamers who choose to kill adversaries “argued that the most effective mechanism for
moral disengagement is that it is only a game.”4 This
response is likened to soldiers who dehumanize their
enemy in order to justify their actions in war.
This tendency to morally disengage may place “digital natives”5 at an ethical disadvantage. In the virtual
world, gamers have taught themselves to accept the
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game’s ludonarrative dissonance, where the mechanics of the game, i.e., killing hundreds of characters, is
antithetical to the concept of being the hero.6 People
do things in a virtual world that they would never do
in the real world. This disengagement has the potential to take all emotion out of the act of killing and
dehumanize the process – already some involved with
unmanned systems compare coordinating unmanned
airstrikes to playing a video game.7
As the process for decision-making becomes more
game-like, there is the possibility that soldiers using
a DSS will accept inappropriate violence. This could
result in the soldiers using a game-set of rules for
decision-making, approving COA that they would
not approve under normal conditions leaving them
susceptible to feelings of guilt and shame. One way
to understand the potential psychological danger is
to examine how performance in battle (reality) that
closely mimics training (game-like environment) has
resulted in moral injury.
MORAL INJURY
Nancy Sherman, professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University defines moral injury as “experiences
of serious inner conflict arising from what one takes to
be grievous moral transgressions that can overwhelm
one’s sense of goodness and humanity.”8 Moral injury
is experienced as an intense inner conflict or incongruence resulting from the violation of deeply held moral
beliefs. Combat is often so severe that it alters the soldier’s view of life and an inadequate moral or religious
base leads to moral injury.9 An inadequate understanding of God only exacerbates the soldier’s internal turmoil compounding the effects of the trauma. When a
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soldier’s morals are loosely based in a mix of civil religion and culture rather than firmly fixed and based on
belief in a higher ideal, deep incongruence can develop
leading to moral injury.
Incongruence between the internal moral code of
decision-makers and the realization of how their action
resulted in transgressions of that code could arise
with the use of DSS. There is the possibility that decision-makers using DSS will fail to realize the situations
presented by the DSS are real. Since decision-makers
using DSS will be trained using situations they know
are not real, they may create a default set of game rules
during training, and default to these rules in battle. This
use of game rules for actual combat has the potential
to result in a deep and abiding incongruence between
their actions and their moral code. In battle, soldiers
might react the same way they do in training, i.e., not
processing their actions as real in the moment, leaving
them open to moral injury as they reflect on the aftermath of their actions.
Military training produces soldiers who automatically respond to their environment, a process called
muscle memory, by habituating the application of violence through repetitive exercises. The result is that
soldiers learn to simply react to their environment
rather than to observe, process, and then engage. For
example, to improve the reflexive nature of engaging
the enemy, in the 1960s Army marksmanship training changed from firing at a stationary circular target
to engaging human silhouettes that moved and were
arrayed at different ranges. This new system was
designed to mimic the act of killing on the battlefield
and taught soldiers to reflexively react to movement in
a morally benign setting that, in many ways, was like a
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game. This behavior was reinforced by marksmanship
badges and other rewards.
The result of reflexive training was an impressive
increase in small arms efficiency, but not without a cost.
At the end of World War II, S. L. A. Marshall found
that only 15 to 20 percent of U.S. soldiers engaged the
enemy with their personal weapon.10 This is compared
to a study of American soldiers who served in Vietnam
where an estimated 90 to 95 percent of soldiers in Vietnam engaged an enemy combatant with their personal
weapon.11 Sergeant Scott Galentine, who was involved
in the 1993 battle of Mogadishu, described killing the
enemy as “just like target practice, only cooler.”12 His
reaction to the battle was echoed by Private First Class
Jason Moore who said:
it seemed to me it was just like a moving target range, and
you could just hit the target and watch it fall and hit the
target and watch it fall, and it wasn’t real. . . . That upsets
me more than anything else, how easy it was to pull the
trigger over and over again.13

Moore’s reaction is akin to gamers using game
ethics instead of their ethical code. During the battle,
he was simply reacting to his environment without
first working through the moral and ethical implications of his actions—the battle seemed like a game.
Once the “game” was over and Moore had time to consider what he had done, he found that his actions had
violated his moral and ethical standards. If training can
habituate violence without moral consideration on the
battlefield, the use of DSS may make moral disengagement even easier by using icons and other avatar-like
symbology to dehumanize the enemy.
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COMPUTER ENHANCED DECISION-MAKING
Contemporary U.S. military command centers
give leaders access to a staggering amount of information. However, there is a point at which too much
data is detrimental to decision-making, reduces situational awareness, and lowers trust.14 To compensate,
over the past 2 decades the Army has explored DSS
to shorten the observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA)
loop.15 In 2002, the Army pitted the Course of Action
Display and Evaluation Tool (CADET) against a team
of field grade officers. CADET produced a battle plan
in about 2 minutes while it took the officers about 16
hours. “The results demonstrated very little difference
between CADET’s and human performance” except
that the CADET DSS reduced the OODA loop by more
than 15 hours per plan and reduced the staffing to one
reviewer.16
The advantages of DSS may obscure a potential
down side. A Korean study indicated that decision
makers might feel compelled to rely on a DSS. Three
primary factors were significant for the DSS to be
accepted and used; institutional pressure, top management support, and the maturity of the host technology.
It is surprising that the quality of the information provided by the DSS was the least important.17 This indicates it is difficult for the operator to evaluate the quality
and accuracy of the data. The results may be that operators will accept the output without moral or ethical
review because they are not capable of fully assessing
DSS recommendations. Research also indicates that
individuals will take unjustified risks with DSS based
on overconfidence. A study examining DSS enabled
investment decisions indicated that overconfidence
resulted from two errors—the illusion of knowledge
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and the illusion of control. The study showed that the
more familiar the individual was with the system, the
riskier their behavior became.18 Researchers noted
that, “Insufficient sensemaking may result in unethical
behavior regardless of an individual’s personal level of
moral development.”19
MAKING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI)
MORAL
DSS clearly have some advantages over humans.
Computers process more information and reach decisions at speeds that dwarf human efforts. Computers
are not susceptible to psychological and physical factors like fatigue, pride, revenge, anger, social pressures,
and biases. Computers do not become more risk-adverse or risk-loving based on emotion. A computer
does not employ “mind-guards” to isolate dissenting
opinion; and does not deploy spurious analogies of
past events without systematically considering parallels.20 However, computer systems do not innately
have a moral center either.
The emerging machine ethics field is attempting
to capture ethics in computer code—based on “principles, parameters and procedures.”21 Machine ethics
incorporates logic models in a computer subroutine
designed to evaluate a course of action against ethical standards. A recent study considered the efficacy
of the relative ethical violation (REV) model for use
with a military DSS. The study involved pitting the
REV model against the survey results of one thousand military members and humanities experts. The
REV model “turned out to be rather accurate, its effectiveness deriving from the proper choice of principles
and weights.”22 This study shows that integrating an
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ethical model into DSS and AI is possible; however, the
process of developing “ethical weighting” may limit
its effectiveness. First, the developers of the system
must define a comprehensive set of ethical standards
and properly weight each one. Second, the system
must be protected from manipulation of the weights
to obtain a certain COA.23 A critical limitation of DSS
and AI is the fact that they must rely on data inputs in
order to make decisions. Therefore, the quality of their
decisions relies on the quality of the data.24 Perhaps the
worst-case scenario is not total failure, but a sub-system failure leading to the production of sub-optimal
and potentially unethical COA.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Moral conflict will always be a part of war because
acceptable conduct in war will always conflict with
norms accepted in civilian life. This conflict creates a
moral dissonance and places a burden on the military
to do everything in its power to prevent psychological
and moral injuries when employing DSS.
The following recommendations will help prevent
psychological and moral injury resulting from the use
of DSS:
1. Training. The Army should provide training at
all levels that reinforces ethical standards and
includes exploration of each soldier’s personal
religious or spiritual center, to develop competent ethical decision-makers. Operators must
understand how DSS processes moral dilemmas, the potential ethical shortcomings of these
decisions, and how to ensure ethical decisions
are made.
2. System Design. Programmers must design
systems that produce COA that are morally
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defendable. Since no system can be created that
is 100 percent reliable, a soldier who is trained
to recognize morally questionable decisions
must always remain in or on the loop.
3. System Education. The Army should educate
leaders in the responsible employment of DSS
and AI systems, particularly in the method
the system uses to integrate ethical principles
into the decision-making process. In addition,
the Army should provide a feedback loop that
allows decision-makers to provide input to the
programmers to enhance the effectiveness of
the system’s ethical model.
4. Moral Review after DSS Training. The Army
should include after-action reviews assessing
the moral and ethical implications of the decisions made during training events for all training involving the use of DSS and AI. This will
help counter the default position of “it’s only a
game” and reinforce the need for all soldiers to
morally evaluate their actions both in training
and in battle.
Widespread military use of AI enabled DSS is inevitable. It is incumbent on the Army to mitigate the
potential negative impacts of using these technologies.
Anything less could lead to an increased number of
Soldiers suffering from psychological or moral injury.
Those who work with these systems must understand
the potential consequences; they must understand that
using these systems is more than a game.
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CHAPTER 13
THE THIRD OFFSET, REMOTELY PILOTED
SYSTEMS (RPS), AND MORAL HAZARDS
Mark Hamilton
Researcher
The Third Offset’s technical focus and developmental approach may engender two distinct, yet compounding, moral hazards, which occur in situations
where “greater risks are taken by individuals who
are able to avoid shouldering the cost associated with
these risks.”1
The first moral hazard originates from the Third
Offset’s technical focus. The Third Offset aims to
reduce risks by increasing the effectiveness of weapons
that remove the human warfighter from the battlefield.
By distancing the human from conflict, this technology lowers not only the costs and risks associated
with fighting, but the political bar to initiating hostilities as well. As a result, the U.S. Government could
inadvertently set conditions for an increase in international conflict. Moreover, these offset technologies are
derivatives from mature, commercial technologies and
as such can be readily militarized and proliferated by
other powers.
The second moral hazard results from the overt
nature of the Third Offset’s development. The unconcealed approach and design of the Third Offset, which
distinguishes itself from previous offsets, raises the
likelihood that American investments in defense modernization will inadvertently subsidize similar foreign efforts through espionage and foreign material
exploitation of U.S. technological designs. These moral
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hazards, taken together, could create a situation where
U.S. defense efforts will inadvertently decrease global
stability and national security.
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF A REMOTELY
PILOTED SYSTEM (RPS)
Today, service members located safely at locations,
such as Creech Air Force Base in Nevada, are piloting
armed Reaper aircraft that are flying in Africa, Europe,
and the Middle East.2 While remotely piloted systems (RPSs) that operate in the air domain are in the
public eye, there are also RPSs that operate in the maritime and land domains. In 2015, the Navy publicly
announced its first operational use of an unmanned
undersea vehicle (UUV).3 Over the past decade, the
Army invested in “more than 7,000” RPSs that assist
with tasks such as explosive ordinance disposal and
reconnaissance.4 However, the Army’s designs and
missions for RPSs are evolving to include target acquisition with lethal and non-lethal effects.
Not surprisingly, this evolution of RPSs capabilities conforms to the Department of Defense’s (DoD)
vision for unmanned systems. As found in the DoD
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036:
The Department of Defense’s vision for unmanned
systems is the seamless integration of diverse unmanned
capabilities that provide flexible options for Joint
Warfighters while exploiting the inherent advantages
of unmanned technologies, including persistence, size,
speed, maneuverability, and reduced risk to human life.
DoD envisions unmanned systems seamlessly operating
with manned systems while gradually reducing the
degree of human control and decision making required
for the unmanned portion of the force structure.5
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To get a sense of the financial costs associated with
achieving that vision, the DoD requested over $2.3 billion for the acquisition of the top three remotely piloted
aircraft (RPA) in 2016. That request did not include
funding for any of the other RPSs or for their associated research and development. This resource request
highlights both the importance that the DoD is placing
on RPSs and the level of financial risks placed upon
potentially fleeting technological superiority.
Regardless of the level of artificial intelligence (AI)
or automation that unmanned platforms of the future
may use, the physical distance between the service
members and the area of conflict will increase. Given
the reality of RPSs operating half a world away, it is not
hard to imagine a future in which significant portions
of the services’ foreign combat missions are controlled
by members that are safely protected in the homeland
or other sanctuary. The reduced risk to service members may increase U.S. proclivity to use force.
In August 1998, there were two near simultaneous
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which intelligence quickly linked to Osama bin
Laden.6 Former President Bill Clinton wanted to send
a strong signal to bin Laden and retaliate with military
force. However, there was hesitation by the senior military leadership to use ground forces.7 Committing aircraft to drop bombs would have required coordination
with surrounding countries for both targets, complicating the operations and increasing risks to the pilots.
However, the military had Tomahawk land attack missiles in its arsenal.
The use of Tomahawks allowed former President
Clinton to retaliate without putting U.S. service members at risk. While not an RPS, these pre-programmed
missiles can fly under radar systems, have a range of
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700-1,350 nautical miles, and can deliver a 1,000-pound
bomb with an accuracy of 30 feet.8 Less than 2 weeks
after the embassy bombings, the United States launched
79 Tomahawks at sites in Sudan and Afghanistan.9
Had unmanned military options not been available, it
is doubtful that the President would have authorized
the use of conventional forces given the potential risks
and the narrow scope of the objectives. This increased
use of Tomahawks by the U.S. political and military
leadership is an illustrative surrogate for the potential
future growth of weaponized RPSs.
Since the United States’ first combat strike by an
armed RPA in 2001, the use of armed RPAs has continued to rise.10 While there is not a public database of all
U.S. RPA strikes, on July 1, 2016, then-President Barack
Obama issued an executive order that requires the
Director of National Intelligence to report the “number
of strikes undertaken by the U.S. Government against
terrorist targets outside areas of active hostilities from
January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016,” and to
provide a yearly update thereafter.11 In accordance with
this executive order, the director released his findings
in “Summary of Information Regarding U.S. Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities,”
which included data from January 20, 2009 to December 31, 2015. It listed 473 strikes, which resulted in an
estimated 2,372-2,581 combatant deaths and 64-116
non-combatant deaths.12 While these figures do not
explicitly state that they were all RPA strikes, there is a
high probability that the United States conducted them
with RPA since they exclude strikes inside the controlled airspaces of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Consider that prior to the use of RPA, a nation would have
to risk the consequences of sending its military personnel to a foreign country to conduct 473 operations and
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kill over 2,000 foreign combatants. U.S. political and
military leadership clearly appreciate the reduction in
operational risks that RPSs capabilities provide.
Recent surveys of the U.S. civilian population also
reflected this desire to reduce operational risks to service members. The Pew Research Center survey found
that 58 percent of the U.S. public approved of the
United States conducting RPA strikes in countries such
as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.13 The authors James
Walsh and Marcus Schulzke surveyed over 3,000 participants to quantify the propensity to support the use
of force when using a low risk platform such as a RPA.14
One of their findings was that “participants were more
likely to support wars that posed lower levels of risk
to American soldiers.”15 Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia
Macdonald surveyed 2,148 U.S. citizens and found
when “given a scenario with a high risk to air crew, 58
percent chose unmanned aircraft, while only 23 percent chose unmanned aircraft in the scenario specifying low risk to air crew.”16 These findings confirm that
“casualty aversion” influences “when and how wars
are waged in democratic societies.”17 The public support for RPA strikes makes them the more politically
viable option. The lower the risk, the more likely countries will engage in conflict through armed RPSs.
As the United States continues to rely on armed
RPSs, the international community has taken notice.
The reduced risks to the operators, the relative low cost
to procure, and the minimal infrastructure to employ
them makes RPSs an appealing military tool. Worldwide sales of RPA have become a big business, with an
estimated growth potential of over $11 billion in 2026,
up from $6 billion in 2016.18 The countries profiting the
most from RPA sales include the United States, Israel,
China, Iran, and Russia.19 With this worldwide growth
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in mind, the U.S. Department of State has started taking
steps to address the proliferation of RPA.
In October 2016, the Department of State issued
a Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use
of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) with 51 other countries.20 This declaration
states, “the international community must take appropriate transparency measures to ensure the responsible
export and subsequent use of these [UAVs] systems.”21
These measures should be taken by the international
community because UAV strikes “could fuel conflict
and instability.”22 As with every competitive market,
the products, such as RPA or any of the other RPSs,
will continue to evolve. One way to acquire the evolving technology is to leverage the research and development costs borne by others. Given the public nature of
the Third Offset, other countries may view the United
States as a target of opportunity to obtain advanced
technology with minimal investment.
LOSING THE OFFSET
Unlike the classified nature of the First and Second
Offsets, former Secretary Hagel took a different
approach and advocated for the Third Offset technological advances in a much more open manner. Openly
soliciting and urging commercial entities to work on
technologies that will be used to offset the capabilities
of U.S. military competitors risks the very nature of
the investment of the offset. The openness of the Third
Offset could fuel the proliferation of advanced armed
RPSs and provide pathways leading to intellectual
property loss and corruption of the technology, putting the tax dollars in the DoD’s modernization efforts
at risk. As the U.S. Government and private entities
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invest billions of dollars in the research and development of the technologies that will support the Third
Offset, foreign nations will attempt to obtain those
advances through less expensive means such as computer network attacks, corporate mergers, or reverse
engineering.
On March 23, 2016, a Chinese national pled guilty
to conspiracy for hacking U.S. defense contractors’
systems in order to steal sensitive data for China. This
conspiracy lasted from 2008 to 2014 and targeted information on the “C-17 strategic transport aircraft and
certain fighter jets produced for the U.S. military.”23
From the design and the technological leap forward,
it is widely assumed that the China’s stealth fighter,
J-20, is based upon the stolen technology. Stealing
advanced technology is but one way to get it. Another
way to obtain a technical edge without the research
and development costs is through corporate mergers
and acquisitions.
China recently announced its “Made in China
2025” vision, which shifts its mergers and acquisitions
from the resource sectors to advanced technologies.24
While this could be viewed as a natural evolution of its
economy, it is possible that the announcement of the
Third Offset influenced their targeted sectors.25 Many
of these targeted sectors have duel commercial and
military associated technologies. A recent example of
China’s focus on a crossover company was its desire
to obtain the German company Aixtron. Aixtron is a
leader in producing advanced gallium nitride epitaxial
wafers, which are extremely useful in military applications due to their heat and radiation tolerance.26
Sales or transfers of military technology to other
counties also increase the risk of technological loss.
Despite formal agreements that restrict further resale
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or access to these technologies by third countries, the
United States has identified partner nations as sources
of technology proliferation. Even with trusted partners, it is impossible to ensure the non-proliferation of
shared technology.
The final way to lose a technological edge is to lose
physical control of the technology. When countries
obtain access to foreign technology such as advanced
weapons, platforms, or devices, they normally study
them in order to replicate or defeat them. While maintaining physical control is an issue with any advanced
military technology, RPSs are unique. By their very
design, they function at some distance from their operator. Additionally, the military will use RPSs more frequently and outside of traditional combat areas due
to their lower operational risks. These unique factors
make RPSs more vulnerable for physical loss and possible exploitation by foreign countries than manned
military platforms.
The current path of the Third Offset as an open partnership with industry, coupled with the long development timelines, allows for strategic positioning by
a foreign nation to influence the supply chain of the
offset technologies. This increases the ability of a competitor to insert counterfeit material into the supply
chain or malicious code in order to disrupt that RPA.
Security of the supply chain is vital for the economy
of the United States as a whole, and it is critical for the
U.S. military
CONCLUSION
The rationale for the DoD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036 and the technologies associated with the Third Offset is to reduce risks to U.S.
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forces by developing and enhancing armed RPSs that
operate effectively in the air, sea, and land domains.
However, this path is not without its own risks to larger
national security concerns: increased international
conflict, proliferation of armed RPSs, and international
efforts to purloin the Third Offset technologies. The
United States can take steps now that will help mitigate these risks, which include reassessing the longterm impact of using armed RPSs outside of combat
zones, strengthening international agreements on the
use and proliferation of armed RPSs, and enhancing
the protection of the U.S.’s Third Offset investments.
If the United States fails to consider the long-term consequences of using armed RPSs or fails to protect the
technology, it will find itself continuing to face these
moral hazards and risks the very purpose of the Third
Offset Strategy.
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CHAPTER 14
THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
ENHANCING SOLDIERS
Jason A. Wesbrock
Researcher
Our suits give us better eyes, better ears, stronger backs . . .
better legs, more intelligence . . . more firepower, greater
endurance, less vulnerability. You look like a big steel
gorilla, armed with gorilla-sized weapons.1

In 1959, when Robert Heinlein first wrote these
words in his book, Starship Troopers, publishers rightly
categorized the book as science fiction. However, what
was considered science fiction 58 years ago is plausible today due to stunning technological advances. The
nexus of technology with the vision of how the U.S.
Army will fight in the future will drive requirements
to better protect Soldiers and make them more effective. Currently available technology can produce suits
like Heinlein’s, which work through sensors and physical controls. However, by 2050, similar suits could
integrate Soldier and suit through neural connectivity,
enabling the suit to provide immediate feedback to the
Soldier and respond instantaneously as an extension
of the Soldier’s body. These technological enhancements create ethical concerns for Soldiers and society.
Because of these concerns, U.S. Army and congressional leaders should carefully examine ethical principles
to address moral considerations before the technology
matures.
The Greenwall Report, which examines ethical implications of Soldier enhancement, defines enhancement
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as “a medical or biological intervention to the body
designed ‘to improve performance, appearance, or
capability besides what is necessary to achieve, sustain, or restore health’.”2 This definition narrows the
consideration of what qualifies as an enhancement, and
enables a focused discussion of the ethical concerns
of temporary and permanent enhancements. A temporary enhancement is a medical or biological intervention that increases performance and is reversible.
For example, pilots on long combat flights are given
amphetamines to remain alert and focused.3 Pilots’ use
of the amphetamines provides ability beyond what is
necessary for normal health and thus qualifies as an
enhancement. A permanent enhancement is a medical
or biological intervention that increases performance
and is irreversible. Using neural implants to permanently link a Soldier to an exoskeleton battle suit, similar to Heinlein’s mobile infantry suit, serves as an
example of a permanent enhancement.
These enhancements create moral concerns for society and the individual Soldiers who receive them. In
1979, The Belmont Report established the common rule
for medical research and proposed a model to judge
an enhancement to be ethical from the perspective of
the individual.4 However, militarization of enhancement technology may also represent a potential benefit to society. Hence, further consideration of ethical
guidance beyond the individual is necessary. A public
health model argues enhancements are ethical when
they serve the greater good.5 In a military context, winning the war provides a benefit to society, but creates a
tension with the moral interests and rights of the individual. The doctrine of double effect proposes that acts
with both good and bad effects may be morally permissible. Considering enhancements morally permissible
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provides a starting point for further exploration of the
ethical implications of enhancements.
The aforementioned models present six moral principles: necessity, proportionality, informed consent,
individual dignity, societal risk, and the doctrine of
double effect. These principles provide a framework to
begin to examine the moral implications of enhancing
Soldiers.6 These principles also apply to both temporary and permanent enhancements. However, because
permanent enhancements are irreversible, this section
will apply the framework of moral principles to consider the ethical implications of Soldier enhancements
as a permanent enhancement.
In this hypothetical example, the United States is at
war with an adversary that possesses advanced weapons and that poses an existential threat to the nation.
The U.S. Army elected to enhance Soldiers in response
to the adversary’s capabilities in order to protect the
United States. For this enhancement, the military
adopted a mobile infantry suit, similar to Heinlein’s;
however, this U.S. Army suit links to Soldiers through
a neural connection. Soldiers receive this neural connection through an operation to emplace a cerebral
implant that allows them to synchronize thoughts
with the suit’s onboard computer. The suit increases
a Soldier’s strength and stamina, affords protection
from the adversary’s advanced weapons, and enables
the Soldiers to carry a large amount of ammunition for
the suit’s advanced weapons. To handle the increased
data flow between the suit and Soldier, the cerebral
implant increases the Soldiers’ mental cognition and
ability to synthesize information. Because of the threat
to society, the U.S. Army screens Soldiers when they
enlist and directs some to enhancement programs. The
cerebral implant leaves a clearly visible plate on the
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Soldiers’ head, where the suit connects to the implants,
but Soldiers view this as a mark of distinction. Soldiers
also retain their enhanced cognition from the implant.
Many in society view this plate as unsightly, and
former enhanced Soldiers find it difficult to establish
relationships with unenhanced people due to differences in cognitive ability. While some people may shun
the enhanced Soldiers, corporations seek them out,
and hire them over unenhanced humans. To remain
competitive in the marketplace, some members of society also seek cerebral enhancements, and further the
discord between unenhanced and enhanced humans.
Furthermore, the cerebral implants deteriorate over
time and are known to cause Alzheimer symptoms in
enhanced humans over time resulting in a shortened
lifespan.
NECESSITY
Using the principle of necessity, one could argue
that the described future battlefield makes this
enhancement necessary to effectively wage war. If the
U.S. military is at a disadvantage and cannot win the
war without the suit, the enhancement is necessary.
The suit is not necessary if it just makes winning the
war easier. Additionally, it is important to note that
if the adversary did not pose an existential threat to
the United States, then the enhancement would not be
necessary.
PROPORTIONALITY
This scenario presents a case where moral goods
outweigh moral harms for both the Soldiers and society.
For example, the benefits of added protection, lethality, and enhanced cognition make the Soldiers better
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able to survive in combat. These benefits outweigh the
moral harms of decreased lifespan and inability to form
lasting relationships. Consider that without human
enhancements, the Soldiers will have a much shorter
lifespan in combat because they would be inferior to
their adversary. Likewise, the security interests of the
United States outweigh the potential societal risks the
enhancements may create if the United States faces an
existential threat. One could argue that society would
cease to exist if the nation ceases to exist.
INFORMED CONSENT
Even if Soldiers receive information, comprehend
the information provided to them, and choose to
receive the enhancement, the coercive nature of offering the suit to some Soldiers provides ethical concerns.
When Soldiers consider the information provided to
them, the most pressing information is the suit makes
them more likely to survive in combat. Not accepting
the enhancement almost guarantees they will die in
combat. Making the Soldier choose between certain
death and capabilities provided by the enhancement
is coercive, and no reasonable person would choose
not to accept the enhancement regardless of the suit’s
negative side effects, making selection of the enhancement a non-choice. Coupling this non-choice with Soldiers’ internal desires to serve their country, be part of
a team, and be successful, offering the suit creates significant perceptions of taking away the Soldiers’ individual autonomy. Likewise, withholding suits from
some Soldiers also affects their individual autonomy
by removing their ability to choose the enhancement,
which condemns unenhanced Soldiers to almost certain death.
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INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY
In this scenario, the enhancement causes several
violations to an individual’s dignity. The perception
of the chain of command ordering Soldiers to accept
enhancements and withholding the choice of the
enhancement from other Soldiers removes their ability to choose, violating their autonomy and individual
dignity. Society’s view of the metal plate also affects the
individual dignity of a Soldier. Corporations seeking
enhanced Soldiers for jobs and the Soldiers’ belief that
the metal plates are a mark of distinction mitigate the
negative societal impressions. However, corporations
choosing enhanced Soldiers over their non-enhanced
humans for jobs would disadvantage the unenhanced
members of society and creates social conflict.
SOCIETAL RISK
The societal risk presented in this scenario builds
from corporations desiring to hire enhanced Soldiers. As
unenhanced individuals seek to remain competitive in
business, they begin seeking their own enhancements.
As the population of enhanced persons increases, so
too does the dichotomy between enhanced and unenhanced persons. This dichotomy increases societal discontent between those who can afford enhancements
and those who cannot. The dichotomy also affects the
individual dignity of unenhanced people. Rationalizing the division between moral harms and goods leads
to the next principle, double effect.
DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
In this scenario, the enhancement fails to pass all
of the elements from the medical and public health
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models. While it passes necessity and proportionality,
it lacks informed consent and harms individual dignity. This point is where the doctrine of double effect
can provide some guidance. The act of providing the
enhancement provides a moral good to both Soldiers
and society in that it prevents the adversary from
destroying the United States, making the enhancement morally permissible. In enhancing Soldiers, the
government intends to provide Soldiers and society,
better protection and more lethality. Even though the
cerebral implant deteriorates, the negative effect is an
unintended harm to the Soldier, and the enhancement
is morally permissible. The bad effects caused by the
deteriorating implants do not make Soldiers more
lethal or provide them more protection so the enhancement remains permissible. Determining the proportionality of this enhancement requires consideration of
the harm and benefits to Soldiers and society. In this
scenario, it is hard to know the amount of harm or benefit caused by the enhancement to society and Soldiers.
Without concrete numbers, determining proportionality is difficult. However, in looking at proportionality, one might consider whether or not the adversary
represents an existential threat to America; how significantly enhancements change societal values; how
quickly the values change; and, how severely the
enhancements negatively affect Soldiers? Answering
these proportionality questions could determine if the
enhancement was permissible under the doctrine of
double effect.
Technology makes possible what was science fiction when Heinlein wrote Starship Troopers. Current
technology makes plausible a shift from improving
Soldiers’ tools to enhancing the Soldier. However,
these enhancements create moral concerns for Soldiers
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and society. Before these enhancement technologies
mature, military, government, and civilian leaders
need to examine the ethical concerns surrounding
enhancements.
Examining enhancements through the lens of several ethical models enables one to scope the ethical concerns involved with military enhancements. A medical
research model accounts for individual interests. The
benefits militarization of technology represents to
society are accounted for using a public health model.
When the interests of the individual do not align with
the interests to society, the doctrine of double effect
can help determine if the act is morally permissible.
The ethical principles of necessity, proportionality, informed consent, individual dignity, societal risk,
and double effect provide a basic framework through
which one can examine ethical concerns of both temporary and permanent enhancements. U.S. Army and
congressional leader discussions should consider the
ethical implications of enhancing Soldiers before the
technology matures.
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the Iraq-Kuwait border. Prior to becoming a FAO, Dr.
Pfaff served on the faculty at West Point as an assistant
professor of philosophy. As a company grade Army
officer, he deployed to Operation DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM with the 82nd Airborne Division
and participated in Operation ABLE SENTRY with the
1st Armored Division. Dr. Pfaff has a bachelor’s degree
in philosophy and economics from Washington and
Lee University, where he graduated cum laude with
honors in philosophy; a master’s degree in philosophy
from Stanford University, with a concentration in the
history and philosophy of science and where received
a graduate fellowship at the Center for Conflict and
Negotiation; a master’s in national resource management from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
where he was a distinguished graduate; and a doctorate in philosophy from Georgetown University.
LYNN I. SCHEEL, Colonel (Col), is the Commander,
Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps, Detachment
220, and professor of aerospace studies at Purdue University. Prior to his current assignment, he was the
U.S. Air Force Senior Service Representative and a faculty instructor in the Department of Military Strategy,
Planning, and Operations at the USAWC. During his
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career that includes four permanent overseas assignments and numerous operational deployments, he has
served as an F‐16 instructor pilot and flight examiner,
forward air controller (airborne), flight commander,
F‐16 squadron and wing weapons officer, operations
officer, fighter squadron commander, and strategy division chief. He is a command pilot with more than 2,800
flying hours, including more than 500 combat hours
over Iraq, Bosnia, and Serbia. Col Scheel is a graduate
of the U.S. Air Force Weapons School, Air Command
and Staff College, School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, and was a senior fellow at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Col Scheel
earned a Master of Aerospace Studies and a Master of
Military Operational Art and Science, both from the
Air University, and a Bachelor of Science from Purdue
University.
T. GREGG THOMPSON, Colonel (COL), is the Chief
of Staff of the USAWC. He has served as the TRADOC
Capability Manager for Maneuver Support, and subsequently the Director for Capability Development and
Integration, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence,
at Fort Leonard Wood. In this role, he served as the
primary capability development proponent for the
Protection Warfighting Function. COL Thompson has
held operational assignments from Platoon Leader to
Deputy Brigade Commander across the Army, including Panama, Korea, Germany, Hawaii, and multiple
other Army installations. He holds a Bachelor of Science in economics from the University of Nebraska;
a Master of Arts and Education from National-Louis
University, Chicago, Illinois; and a Masters of Strategic
Studies from the USAWC.
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